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INTRODUCTION

I come to defend McDonnellDouglas,' to reclaim the promise that
it was once thought to hold. In so doing, I will also make sense of the
doctrinal morass that currently envelops disparate treatment antidiscrimination law. 2 I am not kidding.
I McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To be more precise,
I come to defend the pretext method of proof set forth in the third stage of McDonnell
Douglas. I see little use for the first two stages of McDonnelDouglas. See infra note 91.
2 There are two distinct theories of employment discrimination. Disparate treatment involves so-called intentional discrimination, in which the employer makes an
adverse decision based on a protected characteristic, such as race or sex. 1 BARBARA
LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 10-11 (4th ed. 2007). Disparate
impact discrimination involves decisions based on nonprotected characteristics, such
as performance on a pre-employment test, which correlate with protected characteristics. See id. at 110-11 (listing theories of causation, including disparate treatment and
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McDonnell Douglas is easy to hate. The ubiquitous 3 three-part burden-shifting framework was originally conceived as a gift to disparate
treatment law. 4 However, it quickly fell into extreme disrepute.
The criticism began when the Court, in later opinions, appeared
to place limits on the framework. 5 Critics responded to these opinions with a harsh outcry, claiming that these later opinions severely
hampered the utility of the framework and placed unreasonable burdens on plaintiffs. 6
The next wave of criticism came when it became apparent that
disparate treatment plaintiffs have not been faring well in litigationdespite the perception that employment discrimination continues to
disparate impact). This Article focuses exclusively on disparate treatment, the most
common theory in employment discrimination litigation.
3 See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 36 (2d ed. 2007)
("No decision in employment discrimination law has been cited more frequently than
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.").

4 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("The
shifting burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that
the 'plaintiff [has] his day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.'"
(quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979))); Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58, 255 n.8 (1981) (stating that the purpose of the framework is "to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question" of
discrimination); Tristin K. Green, Comment, Making Sense of the McDonnell Douglas
Framework: CircumstantialEvidence and Proof of Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 87
CAL. L. REV. 983, 998 (1999) (noting that McDonnell Douglas was designed as a

response to the increasing rarity of "smoking gun" evidence in order to permit plaintiffs without such evidence to have their day in court).
5 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding that a
plaintiff who proves pretext in the third stage does not necessarily win; a fact finder
may still find that there was no discrimination); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56 (holding
that the defendant's burden in the second stage of McDonnell Douglas is only a burden
of production, not a burden of persuasion); see also William R. Corbett, McDonnellDouglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 202-03
(2003) (arguing that McDonnell Douglas fell into disfavor largely as a result of later
holdings that arguably limited the framework).
6 See William R. Corbett, The "Fall"of Summers, the Rise of "PretextPlus," and the
Escalating Subordination of FederalEmployment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at Will:

Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REv. 305, 331-32 (1996) (noting that
Hicks "substantially weakened plaintiffs' chances of winning cases at the third stage of
the McDonnell Douglas analysis"); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price

Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 31

FLA. ST.

U. L.

REV.

859, 862 (2004) ("Hicks and Reeves robbed the [McDonnell Douglas] approach of its
vitality."); Shannon R. Joseph, Note, Employment Discrimination: Shouldering the Burden
of Proof After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 963, 988
(1994); see also Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks,

93

MICH.

L. REV. 2229, 2235 & n.28 (1995) (discussing the outcry in commentary

about Hicks).
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be prevalent. 7 Critics responded to this news by blaming McDonnell
Douglas, claiming that the framework is ill suited to addressing the
subtle types of discrimination they believe is most common in the
modern workplace. 8
The view of McDonnell Douglas as flawed has been strongly reinforced by the courts' practice of mandating its use and limiting the
availability of alternative frameworks. The Supreme Court and Congress have each offered an alternative framework for proving disparate treatment: the framework set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkin 9
and the framework set out in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991
Act"). 1° And the widespread perception, among both litigants and
commentators, is that those two alternative frameworks are better for
plaintiffs. 1 ' Accordingly, many (if not most) plaintiffs have attempted
12
to avoid McDonnell Douglas in favor of the alternative frameworks.
But the courts have resisted this exodus with a vengeance, routinely
7 See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After
Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 How. LJ. 937, 953-54 (2005);
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV.
555, 559-61 (2001).
8 See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers,Jr., The Effect of EliminatingDistinctionsAmong Title
VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 99-100 (2004); Chad Derum &
Karen Engle, The Rise of the PersonalAnimosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to
"No Cause" Employment, 81 TEX. L. REX'. 1177, 1181 (2003); Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 111 (2003); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and
Unconscious Discrimination,56 ALA. L. REv. 741, 758 (2005); Malamud, supra note 6, at
2236-38.
9 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071.
10 See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g) (2000).
11 See Corbett, supra note 5, at 200, 219 (suggesting that plaintiffs and employee
rights advocates prefer the "mixed-motive" frameworks of Price Waterhouse and the
1991 Act, whereas defense lawyers prefer McDonnell Douglas). Some plaintiffs, however, prefer McDonnell Douglas, as they are willing to take on what they believe to be a
higher burden in exchange for avoiding the "same decision"/"same action" defense.
See Michael J. Zimmer, The New DiscriminationLaw: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither
McDonnell Douglas ?, 53 EMORY LJ. 1887, 1942-43 (2004). As I will show below,
McDonnell Douglas does not in fact set a higher burden than the alternative
frameworks. See infra Part I.C.3 (arguing that McDonnell Douglas does not prove or
require "but for" causation). And using McDonnell Douglas does not always preclude a
same decision"/"same action" defense. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Tysinger v. Police Dep't, 463 F.3d 569, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the different approaches courts have taken in applying McDonnell Douglas as
opposed to the alternative frameworks); Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 474-75
(8th Cir. 2005) (deliberating about which framework to apply and deciding to apply
McDonnell Douglas rather than Price Waterhouse or the 1991 Act).
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forcing unwilling plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas.13 The foreseeable result has been to reinforce the view that McDonnell Douglasis the
evil stepsister of disparate treatment law and is hampering the goal of
eradicating employment discrimination.
At this point, McDonnellDouglas is faring miserably in the court of
public opinion. It has few friends outside of the defense bar (which
seems content with the framework, but has not mounted any significant defense of it).1 4 And it has a plethora of detractors. 15 The criti13 See infra Part I.A (discussing courts' methods of mandating McDonnell Douglas).
There are actually two ways in which courts can-and do-mandate the use of McDonnell Douglas. First, a court might require the litigants to go through the three steps
that comprise the framework. See, e.g., Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th
Cir. 2004) (requiring the plaintiff to "state a prima facie case of retaliation" under
McDonnell Douglas). Second, a court might require the plaintiff to prove "pretext"that is, to disprove the reason proffered by the defendant for its challenged action.
See, e.g.,
Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 692-94 (7th Cir. 2006). This
Article is primarily concerned with the second form of mandate (requiring the use of
.pretext" proof), arguing that this method of proof should be optional. However,
once the pretext method of proof is optional, it makes little sense to require litigants
to go through the first two steps of the three-step framework (the first form of mandate). See infra note 91.
14 It is difficult to find more than a handful of writers who defend the framework.
See Christopher R. Hedican et al., McDonnell Douglas: Alive and Well, 52 DRAKE L.
REV. 383, 395-402, 425 (2004) (defending McDonnell Douglas as "a fair and appropriate way to ferret out discrimination"); Steven J. Kaminshine, DisparateTreatment as a
Theory of Discrimination:The Need for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. &
C.L. 1, 38-62 (2005) (arguing for the retention of the McDonnell Douglas framework
as one possible method for plaintiffs to present proof of disparate treatment); Zimmer, supra note 11, at 1933 (arguing that McDonnell Douglas should continue to play a
limited role in disparate treatment cases because its "process of elimination is a fundamentally sound way of persuading the factfinder that discrimination was involved in
the [defendant's] decision"). None of these defenders answers the critiques that have
been leveled at McDonnell Douglas.
15 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703, 744-60 (1995); Derum &

Engle, supra note 8, at 1188-90 (discussing unconscious bias); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal

Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1241 (1995); Malamud, supra note 6, at
2236-38 (criticizing the McDonnell Douglas framework and arguing for its abandonment); Marcia L. McCormick, The Allure and Dangerof PracticingLaw as Taxonomy, 58
ARK.

L. REv. 159, 183 (2005); Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Motions for Summary Judgment

when Employers Offer MultipleJustificationsfor Adverse Employment Actions: Why the Exceptions Should Swallow the Rule, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 335, 335; Stephen W. Smith, Title VII's
National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Casefor the PrimaFacie Case?, 12 LAB. LAw. 371,
372-81 (1997);Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "LeRoiEst Mort; Vive le Roil.": An Essay on the Quiet
Demise of McDonnell-Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert

Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 90-108 (2003)
[hereinafter Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort]; Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Requiem for a Heavy-
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cism has reached a fever pitch. Some courts have even joined the
chorus. 16

But despite this, most courts of law (even some that criticize it)
continue to mandate its use-paying little heed to its detractors. Virtually all courts continue to require unwilling plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas.17
A mandatory McDonnell Douglas creates two serious problems.
First, in their eagerness to prevent an exodus from McDonnell Douglas,
the courts have created a doctrinal morass.' 8 There are currently
three separate circuit splits over three distinct doctrines that limit
plaintiffs' ability to avoid McDonnell Douglas.19 In fact, in the wake of
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,20 the case in which the Court appeared
poised to clean up this mess, a debate has erupted among commentators about whether McDonnell Douglas should ever apply-or whether
it is "dead." 21 (This appears to be wishful thinking, as no court has
weight: Costa as Countermonument to McDonnell Douglas-A Countermemory Reply to
Instrumentalism,67 ALB. L. REV. 965, 1011 (2004) (referring to McDonnell Douglasas a
"creeping malaise ... that evolved to euthanize Title VII cases"); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1148 (1999); see also Corbett, supra note 5, at 202
(noting that McDonnellDouglas "has not been very popular among many scholars and
employee rights advocates, and many have called for its abandonment").
16 See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 745 (8th Cir. 2004)
(Magnuson,J., concurring specially) ("For thirty years, courts have been slaves to the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting paradigm that is inconsistent with Title VII.");
Wells v. Colo. Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring) (writing separately to express "displeasure" with the use of the McDonnell
Douglas framework because "McDonnell Douglas has served its purpose and should be
abandoned"); Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991-92 (D. Minn.
2003).
17 See infra Part I.A.
18 See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851-54 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that this area of law has been referred to as "a quagmire," a "morass," and "chaos"),
affd, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Benjamin C. Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating FactorTest for
Individual Disparate Treatment Claims, 100 MICH. L. REV. 234, 269 (2001) (using the
term "morass"); Zimmer, supra note 11, at 1916 (using the term "morass" (quoting
Desert Palace,299 F.3d at 853)); see also Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment
DiscriminationLaw Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REv. 651,
654 (2000) (referring to McDonnell Douglas and the other analytical frameworks created in Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act as a "substantive and procedural swamp in
employment discrimination law"); Paul N. Cox, Substance and Process in Employment
DiscriminationLaw: One View of the Swamp, 18 VAL. U. L. REv. 21, 22 (1983) (describing
employment discrimination law as "incoherent").
19 See infra Part II.C.
20 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
21 See Chambers, supra note 8, at 95-99; Corbett, supranote 5, at 200; Davis, supra
note 6, at 907; Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort, supra note 15, at 72 (describing McDonnell
Douglas as "'dead as a doornail'" (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL
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adopted this position.) 22 At the very least, this doctrinal confusion
creates significant uncertainty and additional cost for litigants. 23
But there is a more serious problem: If the critics of McDonnell
Douglas are correct, the courts' practice of mandating its use would
have disastrous consequences. A mandatory-but-flawed McDonnell
Douglas would saddle plaintiffs with difficult and unreasonable burdens, causing meritorious claims to fail. 24 Thus, a mandatory-butflawed McDonnell Douglas would ultimately hamper the goal of eradicating employment discrimination.
This Article will argue that both sides in this debate are wrong. It
will argue that the courts are wrong to require unwilling plaintiffs to
use McDonnell Douglas. But it will also argue that plaintiffs and com(John C. Winston Co. 1938) (1849)); see also Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 7 (using
the term "dead"); Charles A. Sullivan, DisparateImpact: Looking Past the Desert Palace
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 935 (2005) ("McDonnell Douglas may be either

doctrinally or functionally dead .... "); Zimmer, supra note 11, at 1932 (arguing that
McDonnell Douglasis mostly dead). But see Hedican et al., supra note 14, at 383 (arguing that McDonnell Douglas is "alive and well"); Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado About Nothing-Why Desert Palace Neither Murdered McDonnell
Douglas nor Transformed All Employment Discrimination Cases to Mixed Motive, 36 ST.
MARY's L.J. 395, 405 (2005) ("[N]othing in Desert Palace hints at the death or even
wounding of McDonnell Douglas.").

22 "Dead" critics frequently cite Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987,
991-92 (D. Minn. 2003), as adopting this position. See Davis, supra note 6, at 890-91
(suggesting that the court in Dare found McDonnell Douglas to be dead in light of
Desert Palace); Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort, supra note 15, at 139-42 (discussing the
court's reasoning in Dareas rejecting McDonnell Douglas in favor of Desert Palace). But

Dare only declared that, under the 1991 Act, there was no such thing as a "single
motive" case, in which, unlike "mixed motive" cases, the "direct evidence" distinction
(and thus McDonnell Douglas) might continue to apply after Desert Palace. Dare, 267 F.

Supp. 2d at 991-92. It did not purport to eradicate McDonnellDouglas in cases outside
the 1991 Act. Moreover, despite Dare's hostility to McDonnell Douglas, to the extent
that it purported to eradicate McDonnell Douglas even in 1991 Act cases, that case has
been overruled. See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735-36 (8th Cir.
2004) (giving plaintiffs a choice about whether to use McDonnell Douglas in 1991 Act
cases).
23 See George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, When Ignorance is Bliss: Information
Exchange and Inefficiency in Bargaining,33J. LEGAL STUD. 37, 43 (2004) ("In the pres-

ence of uncertainty, the expectations of the two parties are likely to diverge, and
negotiators can easily fail to agree despite the potential for profitable settlement."
(citing Kalyan Chatterjee & Larry Samuelson, Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete
Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers, 54 REV. ECON. STUD. 175,
175-92 (1987))); cf. Charles Silver, Does CivilJustice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REv.

2073, 2107 (2002) ("When parties agree on expected trial results (as fully informed,
rational parties always should), they should settle to minimize transaction costs.").
24 See Malamud, supra note 6, at 2236-38 (arguing that the McDonnell Douglas
proof structure "constrain [s] fact finding" and should be abandoned).
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mentators are wrong to demonize McDonnell Douglas. Rather, they
should embrace McDonnell Douglas as a true gift to antidiscrimination
law. In making these arguments, this Article will also propose an
understanding of McDonnell Douglas (as an optional method of proof)
that will eliminate the current doctrinal morass and its attendant
uncertainty.
These arguments will not rely upon interpretations of Desert Palace, the standard basis for most modern calls to reject McDonnellDouglas (calls that have been virtually ignored by the courts).25 Instead, my
arguments will proceed by contextualizing McDonnell Douglas-by
understanding this framework in relation to disparate treatment's
core requirement of causation (the requirement that a challenged
employment decision must occur "because of" a protected characteristic, such as race or sex).26
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I argues that McDonnell
Douglas should never be required (and, in the process, dispels the
nearly universally held myth that this framework proves or requires
"but for" causation). Part II shows how a nonmandatory McDonnell
Douglas would interact with the two alternative frameworks (Price
Waterhouse and the 1991 Act), and also shows how a nonmandatory
McDonnell Douglas can be implemented under current law. This Part
also resolves the three doctrinal debates that currently plague disparate treatment law. Part III refutes most of the normative criticisms
that have been leveled at McDonnell Douglas and demonstrates the
importance of this framework to the goal of eradicating employment
discrimination.

I.

THE DEATH OF A MANDATORY MCDONNELL DOUGLAS (AND THE
MYTH THAT MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PROVES OR REQUIRES
"BUT FOR")

McDonnell Douglas should never be required. The first section of
this Part shows how courts have come to mandate the use of McDonnell
Douglas. The next section explores the conditions under which it
might make sense to mandate its use. This section argues that it
would make sense to require plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas if and
only if that framework proved "but for" causation. However, as the
final section of this Part shows, contrary to widespread belief, McDon25 See Van Detta, Le Roi Est Mort, supra note 15, at 138-39 & n.332 (suggesting
that the shift from McDonnell Douglas in light of Desert Palacewill occur gradually over
time rather than immediately, and noting several cases in which courts "have not fully
grasped or discussed" the full implications of Desert Palace).
26 See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
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nell Douglas does not always prove "but for" causation. Therefore it
should never be mandatory.
A.

The Origins (and Staying Power) of a Mandatory
McDonnell Douglas

When McDonnell Douglas was introduced by the Court in 1973,
there was no discussion about whether it was mandatory. There was
no need for such a discussion then. McDonnell Douglas "was the only
27
game in town."

Things got more complicated in 1989 when the Court introduced
a second framework for proving disparate treatment claims in Price
Waterhouse.28 McDonnell Douglas had used a three-step framework,
focused on "pretext": (1) The plaintiff must prove a prima facie case;
(2) then the defendant must offer a nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged employment action; and (3) then the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant's proffered reason was "pretextual." 29 The new
Price Waterhouse framework contained only two steps, and did not mention pretext: (1) The plaintiff must prove that a protected factor, such
as race or sex, was a "motivating factor" for the challenged employment action; and (2) then the defendant can try to prove that it would
30
have made the "same decision" irrespective of the protected factor.
31
If the defendant does so, it is a complete defense.
The existence of two different frameworks raised the question of
the relationship between those two frameworks. Would the plaintiff
be allowed to choose which framework to use? Or would the court
mandate the use of one framework?
27 Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Traditional
and Reverse Discriminationin Title VII Proof 46 Wm.& MARY L. Riv. 1031, 1060 n.122

(2004) ("For more than a decade after it was decided, McDonnell Douglas was the only
game in town for individual disparate treatment cases.").
28 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261-79 (1989) (O'ConnorJ., concurring), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071.
29 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). The
word "pretext" is ambiguous, having been used in a number of different ways. For a
discussion of the best understanding of this word, see infra note 76.
30 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring). At some
points, Justice O'Connor uses the term "substantial factor," rather than "motivating
factor." See, e.g., id. at 265. However, there is no logical distinction between these two
formulations. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense
of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 503-11 (2006).

31

See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor, whose concurrence in Price Waterhouse is generally seen as controlling,3 2 answered this question-and introduced the
concept of a mandatory McDonnell Douglas. She was concerned that
the Price Waterhouse framework was more favorable to plaintiffs than
McDonnell Douglas.3 3 She therefore believed that, if given a choice,
most plaintiffs would choose Price Waterhouse.34 Apparently, she
thought this would be a bad thing, and thus decided to limit plaintiffs'
ability to use the more favorable Price Waterhouse-and thereby to
escape the less favorable McDonnell Douglas.35 The idea was to reserve
Price Waterhouse for those plaintiffs she thought most deserving: those
who could produce "direct evidence" of discrimination. 36 Plaintiffs
who could produce "direct evidence" were allowed to use Price
37
Waterhouse, all others were forced to use McDonnell Douglas.
Thus began the tradition of mandating the use of McDonnell
Douglas. This tradition has been robust to the point of intransigence.
It has now spread beyond Price Waterhouse, taking firm root in the most
unlikely of places: the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
The 1991 Act provides yet a third framework for proving disparate treatment. This two-step framework requires that: (1) The plaintiff must prove that a protected factor, such as race or sex, was a
"motivating factor" for the challenged employment action; (2) then
the defendant may try to prove that it would have taken the "same
action" irrespective of the protected factor. 38 If the defendant does
so, it is a partial defense; liability attaches, but damages are limited.3 9
Notably, the 1991 Act does not say a word about "direct evidence," and neither does its legislative history. 40 Moreover, the Act
was intended by Congress as a repudiation of Price Waterhouse.4' So,
32 See Zimmer, supra note 11, at 1910; see also Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387
F.3d 733, 743 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J., concurring specially) (noting that after
Price Waterhouse, courts followJustice O'Connor's direct evidence distinction).
33 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (providing that a plaintiff must show that a
protected characteristic was a "motivating factor" in the adverse decision); id. § 2000e5(g) (2) (B) (providing that once a plaintiff has done so, the defendant may demonstrate that it would have taken the "same action" absent consideration of the protected characteristic).
39 Id. § 20OOe-5(g) (2) (B).
40 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 95, 97-98 (2003).
41 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), at 45-49 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 583-87 (discussing the need to overturn Price Waterhouse).

2007 ]

RECLAIMING

MCDONNELL

DOUGLAS

one might not have expected the "direct evidence" concept from Price
Waterhouse to find its way into 1991 Act jurisprudence. Yet all but one
circuit initially adopted this concept wholesale, requiring plaintiffs to
provide "direct evidence" in order to use the 1991 Act framework; all
others had to use McDonnell Douglas.4 2 Such is the power of a
mandatory McDonnell Douglas.
In fact, even after the Supreme Court rebuffed these circuits in
Desert Palace, unanimously rejecting a "direct evidence" requirement
in 1991 Act cases, 43 the lower courts have found other creative ways to
mandate the use of McDonnell Douglas. Most of the lower courts have
limited Desert Palaceto 1991 Act cases, preserving the "direct evidence"
doctrine-and a mandatory McDonnell Douglas-in cases brought
under other disparate treatment statutes, 4 4 such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) 45 or Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA). 46 And even in 1991 Act cases-where Desert Palace
clearly eradicated the "direct evidence" requirement-courts have
42 See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 95 (indicating that circuits outside of the Ninth
required 1991 Act plaintiffs without "direct evidence" to use McDonnell Douglas);
Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 28-29 (same). Several circuits had ruled on the question at that point. See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 639-40 (8th Cir.
2002); Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 91 F.3d 1449, 1453 (11 th Cir. 1996); Fuller v. Phipps,
67 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Green, supra note 4, at 992-93 (noting
post-1991 Act courts that applied "direct evidence" distinction from Price Waterhouse).
43 See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02. The portion of the 1991 Act that is relevant to the issues discussed in this Article amended section 703(a) of Title VII (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)), as well as section 706(g) of Title VII (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat 1071, 1075-76
(1991). The amended part of section 706(g) relates specifically to cases brought
under section 703(a). Accordingly, for purposes of this Article (and in disparate
treatment law generally), we can refer to cases brought under section 703(a) as "1991
Act cases," and cases brought under any other disparate treatment statute as "non1991 Act cases."
44 See, e.g., EEOC v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co., 364 F.3d 160, 164 n.1 (4th Cir.
2004) (assuming that "direct evidence is still a prerequisite for a mixed-motive analysis in ADEA cases"); Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing
why the Price Waterhouse "direct evidence" distinction should remain applicable to
ADEA claims after Desert Palace); Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assurance Co., 359 F.3d 296,
300 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying the "direct evidence" distinction in an ADEA case); Harp
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. Civ.A. 04-2205, 2006 WL 1517390, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa. May
31, 2006) (applying the "direct evidence" distinction in an ADA case). But see Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying Desert
Palacein a FMLA case); Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 311 (5th Cir.
2004) (applying the reasoning of Desert Palacein an ADEA case).
45 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
46 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
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nevertheless found at least two ways to mandate the use of McDonnell
Douglas. One group of courts has found a new limit to replace the
now defunct "direct evidence" limit: these courts have held that plaintiffs can use the 1991 Act framework only if they plead a "mixed
motive" case (an undefined and possibly meaningless term); all other
plaintiffs must use McDonnell Douglas.47 Another group of courts has
held that all plaintiffs must use McDonnell Douglas, though these
courts "modified" McDonnell Douglas to incorporate elements of the
1991 Act.

48

Thus, a mandatory McDonnell Douglas remains firmly entrenched
in disparate treatment law.
B.

The Need for a "But For" Standard in Order to Justify Mandatory
Application of McDonnell Douglas

It makes sense to mandate McDonnell Douglas if and only if it
proves "but for" causation. The premise for requiring McDonnell
Douglas in certain cases, as opposed to one of the alternative
frameworks (Price Waterhouse or the 1991 Act), must be that (1) the
law requires something more in some cases than is required by the
alternative frameworks, and (2) requiring litigants to use McDonnell
49
Douglas somehow assures they will provide that something more.
47 See, e.g., Richardson, 434 F.3d at 333; Bloomer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 94 F.
App'x 820, 826 (10th Cir. 2004); Winter v. Bank of Am., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-1591-L,
2003 WL 23200278, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2003).
48 See, e.g., Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 341 (5th Cir. 2005);
Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312; Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854,
864-65 (M.D.N.C. 2004); see also Brown v. Westaff (USA), Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1011,
1016-18 & n.6 (D. Minn. 2003) (discussing the implications of Desert Palace); Dunbar
v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers of Iowa, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1196 (N.D. Iowa 2003)
(same). But see Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2004)
(not adopting the modified version of McDonnell Douglas). For details on this modification, see infra note 136.
49 Of course, it would make sense to require McDonnell Douglas if the legislature
so mandated. However, McDonnell Douglas is a creature of the common law; it is not
mentioned in Title VII or any other major disparate treatment statute. See Sandra F.
Sperino, Flying Without A Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas is Not Justified by Any
Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 Hous. L. REV. 743, 762-90 (2006) (arguing that
the McDonnell Douglasframework should be abandoned because it is not supported by
the text, legislative history or purpose of Title VII, or by any accepted principle of
statutory construction). One might also argue that it makes "sense" for courts to
require McDonnell Douglas as long as the Supreme Court has told them to. This would
not meet my definition of making sense. A flawed interpretation of a statute by the
Supreme Court is still a flawed interpretation and should be changed. But, as I will
argue in Part II.B, infra, the Supreme Court has fortunately given no such
instructions.
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This subpart will show that the only possible something more is "but
for" causation.
Causation is the core requirement of disparate treatment. An
adverse employment action (such as firing or failure to hire) is actionable only if that action occurs "because of' a protected characteristic
(such as race or sex). 5 0 So, if disparate treatment law requires something more of plaintiffs than might be required by the alternative
frameworks, that something more must relate to causation.
There are two distinct causal standards available in current disparate treatment law: a "but for" standard and a "motivating factor" standard. 51 In logical terms, the "but for" standard represents the concept
of necessity. A factor (such as race or sex) is necessary to a decision
(such as a firing)-a "but for" cause-if the decision would not have
occurred absent (or "but for") that factor. In logical terms, the "motivating factor" standard represents a concept called minimal causation.52 A factor (such as race or sex) is minimally causal-a "motivating

factor"-where that factor has a tendency to bring about a decision
(such as firing), but does not rise to the level of being necessary to (a
"but for" cause of) that decision.5 3 This occurs where a decisionmaker considered the factor (race or sex) in her decision, but
would have reached the same decision even had she not considered
that factor (due to the presence of some other factor, such as habitual
54
tardiness or poor performance).
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Numerous other antidiscrimination laws
use similar language. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29
U.S.C.A § 623 (West 1998 & Supp. 2007); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C § 12112 (2000). As should be clear from the text, disparate treatment law also
requires some kind of adverse employment action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); 14A
C.J.S. Civil Rights § 236 (2006). However, McDonnell Douglas does not implicate this
requirement. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (omitting an adverse employment action from analysis of pretext).
51 There are actually three available concepts in causal logic: necessity, sufficiency, and minimal causation. See Katz, supra note 30, at 503-04. However, only two
of these concepts-necessity and minimal causation-appear in current disparate
treatment law. Id. I have argued that this is a mistake; as a normative matter, disparate treatment law should be changed to impose sanctions based on the concept of
sufficiency. Id. at 541-44.
52 See id. at 503-07.
53 More precisely, a factor is minimally causal if it has a tendency to bring about
the decision (firing), but does not rise to the level of being necessary or sufficient to
that decision. See id. at 506. In the text, I omit sufficiency to avoid confusion, because
that concept does not appear in current disparate treatment law. See supra note 51.
54 See Katz, supra note 30, at 503-07. Some writers in disparate treatment use the
phrase "substantial factor," presumably as a way of trying to describe a type of causation that is more restrictive than "motivating factor" causation and less restrictive than
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"But for" causation is, by definition, more restrictive than "motivating factor" causation. As noted above, a factor is a "motivating factor" where it has some causal influence but does not rise to the level of
"but for."
The two alternative frameworks (Price Waterhouse and the 1991
55
Act) require plaintiffs to prove only "motivating factor" causation.
Thus, if certain disparate treatment cases require something more of
plaintiffs than the two alternative frameworks do, that something
more must be "but for" causation. Accordingly, it makes sense to
require plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas, as opposed to one of the
alternative frameworks, if and only if (1) the law requires some plaintiffs to prove "but for" causation, and (2) McDonnell Douglas implements that law by requiring those plaintiffs to prove "but for"
causation.

56

"but for" causation. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. However, as a matter of causal logic, there is no type of
causation between minimal ("motivating factor" causation) and necessity ("but for"
causation). Thus, "substantial factor" causation is best understood as being
equivalent to minimal-or "motivating factor"-causation. See Katz, supra note 30, at
503-07.
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). There is an important difference between the two alternative
frameworks in terms of the consequence of proving "motivating factor" causation.
Under Price Waterhouse, such a showing only transfers the burden of proof to the
defendant; if there is no "but for" causation (i.e., the defendant proves a "same decision" defense), there is no liability. See id. Under the 1991 Act, such a showing triggers liability and at least minimal damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B) (making
the "same action" defense only a partial defense). However, the premise for requiring McDonnell Douglas is that it requires more of plaintiffs than either of the alternative frameworks. Thus, for our purposes, it suffices to say simply that the alternative
frameworks require "motivating factor" causation-that, upon such a showing, the
plaintiff gets some benefit (in Price Waterhouse, a burden shift; in the 1991 Act, liability
and a burden shift).
56 There are actually three distinct concepts at work here. First, McDonnell Douglas might be required as a substantive standard if that framework imposed a higher
substantive standard than that imposed by the two alternative frameworks. That is, it
would make sense to require McDonnellDouglas if it demanded a "but for" standard of
causation, while the alternative frameworks demanded only a "motivating factor" standard of causation. Second, McDonnell Douglas might be required as a method of proofif
that framework proved a higher standard than that proved by the two alternative
frameworks. That is, it would make sense to require McDonnell Douglas if it proved
"but for" causation, while the alternative frameworks proved only "motivating factor"
causation. Third, McDonnell Douglas might be required as a proceduralrequirement if it
contained a more stringent burden of proof than the two alternative frameworks.
That is, it would make sense to require McDonnell Douglas if it placed the burden for
proving a particular standard (such as "but for" causation) on the plaintiff, while the
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For purposes of this subpart, I will assume that the law might
57
require some plaintiffs to prove "but for" causation in some cases.
The question, therefore, is whether McDonnell Douglas can be seen as
implementing this requirement. In other words, does McDonnell
Douglas prove "but for" causation, such that forcing plaintiffs to use
McDonnell Douglas is tantamount to forcing them to prove "but for"
causation?
Virtually all writers believe that McDonnell Douglasdoes prove "but
for" causation. 58 This is likely the foundation-and the only possible
alternative frameworks placed that burden on the defendant. The formulation in the
text condenses all three of these concepts for the sake of simplicity. I will distinguish
these concepts below in Part II.A.
57 I will question this assumption below in Part I1.C.1 (arguing that plaintiffs
should never be required to bear the burden of proving "but for"). But for purposes
of the instant argument, I will assume that, in some cases, plaintiffs might be required
to meet this burden.
58 See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 745 (8th Cir. 2004)
(Magnuson, J., concurring specially) (noting that McDonnell Douglas "focuses on the
but-for cause of the employment decision"); Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1076
(10th Cir. 2004); Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 192 n.3 (4th Cir.
2003); Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 597 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (adopting the
determinative-factor test, which is equivalent to the "but for" test); Ostrowski v. Ad.
Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 185 (2d Cir. 1992) (adopting the determinative-factor
test); Konowitz v. Schnadig Corp., 965 F.2d 230, 232 (7th Cir. 1992) (adopting the
"but for" test); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41
Hous. L. REv. 1549, 1567 & n.107 (2005) ("It is often stated that the McDonnellDouglas pretext analysis adopted a but-for standard of causation."); Davis, supra note 6, at
895 & n.197; Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 5, 18; Robert A. Kearney, The High Price of
Price Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct Evidence of Discrimination,5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 303, 310 (2003); Stan Pietrusiak, Labor and Employment Law, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV,.
911, 924 (2006); Zimmer, supra note 11, at 1930 (noting that in McDonnell Douglas
cases, courts have typically required plaintiff to prove that the discriminatory motivation was a "but for" cause of the employer's decision).
The idea that McDonnell Douglas requires "but for" causation seems to come from
three places. First, it may have come from the apparent association in certain
Supreme Court cases between "but for" and McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g., Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (stating that an ADEA plaintiff must prove
that age was a "determinative influence," which likely means "but for" causation, and
indicating that the plaintiff might be able to do so using McDonnell Douglas); see also
Davis, supra note 6, at 895 (noting that many writers believe that McDonnell Douglas
requires "but for" causation based on Hazen Paper). However, just because the
Supreme Court might believe that McDonnell Douglas proves "but for" causation does
not make it so. Second, the idea that McDonnell Douglas requires "but for" causation
may come from the (also flawed) idea that this framework works by a process of elimination. If McDonnell Douglas eliminated all possible nondiscriminatory reasons for the
challenged action, it would in fact prove "but for" causation. See infra Part I.C.4.
However, contrary to popular belief, McDonnell Douglas does not work this way. See
infra Part I.C.2. Third, the idea that McDonnell Douglas requires "but for" causation
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basis-for the McDonnell Douglas mandate. The problem, as we will
see in the next section, is that McDonnell Douglas does not prove, and
therefore does not require, "but for" causation.
C.

McDonnell Douglas Does Not Prove-orRequire- "But For"

McDonnell Douglas itself does not specify any causal standard that
59
must be proven. The framework merely speaks of proving "pretext."
But disparate treatment statutes do not speak of "pretext." Disparate
treatment statutes speak only of causation-the requirement that the
employer act "because of' a protected characteristic such as race or
sex. 60 Thus, the question becomes: what causal standard (if any) does
"pretext" embody?
To answer this question, we must look at how "pretext" operates
as a method for proving causation. This, in turn, will allow us to determine what type of causation McDonnell Douglas proves-and therefore
what type of causation the framework can be seen as requiring. We
will see that, contrary to popular belief, it does not always prove "but
for" causation.
1.

How McDonnell Douglas Works: The Chain of Inferences

Proving causation can be incredibly difficult. 61 On rare occasions, an employer might admit, "I fired the plaintiff because she was a
woman." But in most cases, a victim must find some other way to
prove causation.62
McDonnell Douglas provides another way to prove causation. It
does so by providing the victims of discrimination with a target of
sorts-a reason given by the employer for its actions. 63 This allows the
may come from the (also flawed) observation that McDonnell Douglas presents an
either-or dichotomy, in which a factfinder must find either that the employer was
motivated by a nondiscriminatory reason or that the employer was motivated by discrimination. It is true that, in such an either-or world, there would always be "but for"
causation. See infra Part I.C.4. However, as will be seen below, this is a flawed understanding of McDonnell Douglas, which does not in fact posit such a dichotomous world.
See infra Part III.D.1.
59 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
60 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a) (2000); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
61
See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1980) (noting
that proof of intentional discrimination can be "elusive").
62 See id.
63 The employer is required to explain its action only after the plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. However, the prima facie
case is designed to set a fairly low threshold, which most plaintiffs are able to clear.
See Smith, supranote 15, at 377 ("The 'burden' of showing a prima facie case is com-
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victim to shoot at this target, to attempt to attack the employer's

explanation. If the victim can cast doubt on the employer's explanation, a factfinder might conclude that the explanation was a cover-up
64
for discrimination.
Although many courts and commentators speak of the inference
of discrimination which can be drawn from proof of "pretext, '65 this
method of proof does not generally rely on a single inference.
Rather, it works through a chain of successive inferences. 66 Undermonly acknowledged to be extremely light."); see also Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky,
Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in Discrimi-

nation Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 668 (1998) (noting that the "prima facie case has
evolved into something of a formality" and "many courts simply presume that the
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case").
64 Students of McDonnell Douglas--and those who have grown accustomed to
reading articles and cases with prolonged discussions of the three stages of McDonnell
Douglas-will note that I have skipped rather quickly to the third stage of the framework, the "pretext" stage. The point I am making focuses on the third stage. As
discussed in the text, it is by proving pretext that the plaintiff actually uses the McDonnell Douglas framework to prove causation. See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of CircumstantialProof in Employment DiscriminationLitigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
Pretext, and the "Personality"Excuse, 18 BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 183, 191 (1997)

(noting that "[t] he crux of an individual disparate treatment lawsuit is ... the pretext
stage"); Hart, supra note 8, at 753 (remarking that "the third stage of the McDonnellDouglasframework is where most of the action.., seems to be"); Sam Stonefield, NonDeterminativeDiscrimination,Mixed Motives, and the Inner Boundary of DiscriminationLaw,

35 Buir. L. REv. 85, 111 & n.89 (1986) ("The pretext issue is where the action is,
where most disparate treatment cases are won or lost."). In fact, I argue that that
primary purpose-perhaps the only purpose-of the prima facie case (the first stage)
is to trigger the defendant's obligation to proffer a reason for the challenged action
(the second stage), and that the only reason for this is to provide the plaintiff with a
target to attack in order to prove causation. See infra note 91.
65 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)
("'[R]ejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to
infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.'" (emphasis omitted) (quoting
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256
(stating that a plaintiff may satisfy her "ultimate burden of persuading the court that
she has been a victim of intentional discrimination.., by showing that an employer's
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence"); see also Kenneth R. Davis, Age Discrimination and DisparateImpact: A New Look at an Age-Old Problem, 70 BROOK. L. REv.
361, 370 n.64 (2004) ("[A] plaintiff [may] prove discrimination inferentially by proving that the defendant's alleged justification for the challenged action was a pretext
for discrimination."); Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination:A Matterof Perspective Rather
Than Intent, 34 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 657, 669 (2003) (noting that the Court in

Hicks held that "proof of pretext leads to a permissive ...
inference of
discrimination").
66 A few courts and commentators occasionally seem to grasp the fact that McDonnell Douglas relies on a chain of inferences. See, e.g., William J. Vollmer, Note, Pretext
in Employment DiscriminationLitigation: Mandatory Instructionsfor Permissible Inferences?,
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standing this chain is essential to understanding the potential and the
limits of McDonnell Douglas, ahd to unraveling the confusion that has
enveloped this framework.
To understand this chain of inferences, a hypothetical example
may be helpful. Suppose that an employer has fired an employee.
The employer, called upon to explain its action, says it fired the
employee for stealing. But suppose the employee convinces the
factfinder that she did not in fact steal.
From the fact that the proffered reason is wrong, a factfinder can
draw one of two inferences. First, the factfinder could infer that the
employer was simply mistaken-that it actually but incorrectly
believed the employee had stolen. Second, the factfinder could infer
that the employer was lying-that it knew that the employee had not
stolen, but nevertheless claimed that the employee was a thief. So the
wrongness of the employer's stated reason could support either a finding of innocent mistake or a finding that the employer lied. If the
factfinder concludes that the defendant's error was an innocent mistake, then the process is at an end; the pretext inquiry would not yield
67
any proof of discrimination.
Now suppose that the factfinder concludes that the employer's
stated reason was a lie. 68 Once the factfinder concludes that the
employer has lied, it may again draw two different inferences from
this fact. First, the factfinder might conclude that the employer lied
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 407, 410 (2004) (referring to a "chain of inferences"); see also
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 ("In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably
infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose."). However, no court or commentator has analyzed each
step in the chain, as necessary to truly understand McDonnell Douglas. (And almost all
go on-mistakenly-to talk about McDonnell Douglas as working by a process of elimination, as opposed to by a chain of inferences. See infra Part I.C.2, especially note 81.)
67 The fact that a mistake might be an honest one-and not a cover-up for discrimination-demonstrates that good faith should be a defense in a pretext case.
Most courts have so held. See, e.g.,
Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419
(7th Cir. 2006) ("An honest mistake, however dumb, is not [a pretext]."); Exum v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 389 F.3d 1130, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 2004) ("To show pretext, the

plaintiff must call into question the honesty or good faith of the [employer's] assessment of his abilities."); cf.Rivas Rosado v. Radio Shack, Inc., 312 F.3d 532, 535 (1st
Cir. 2002) ("Title VII . . . does not ensure against inaccuracy by an employer, only
against gender-based discrimination."). But see ROBERT BELTON ET AL, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 103-04 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing divergent positions on good
faith defense).
68 This conclusion might be based on the fact that the employer's reason was
mistaken (which, as noted above, might support such an inference), or from the fact
of mistake in addition to other facts which might suggest that the employer knew the
claim of theft was wrong.
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for a benign reason, such as to protect the employee's feelings. 69

Alternatively, the factfinder might conclude that the employer lied to
70
cover up some less benign fact.

Again, if the factfinder draws the first of these inferences (a lie
for benign reasons), the pretext inquiry is at an end. The inquiry will
not provide any evidence of discrimination. However, if the factfinder
concludes that the lie was a cover-up for a more embarrassing reason,
71
the process can continue.
From the fact of a cover-up, the factfinder can again draw one of
two inferences. First, the factfinder might infer that the employer lied
to cover-up an embarrassing but nondiscriminatory reason. For exam69 Saying the employee was a thief is unlikely to support an inference that the
employer was trying to protect the employee's feelings. But other stated reasons
which turn out to be incorrect, such as a statement that employee's job functions were
"no longer required," might support an inference of a benign lie. See, e.g., Rhodes v.
Guiberson Oil Tools, 39 F.3d 537, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1994) (Zagel, J., concurring specially) (observing that employers, when firing workers, often give polite, dishonest
explanations to "soften the blow"), rev'd en banc, 75 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996); Sigal
Constr. Co. v. Stanbury, 586 A.2d 1204, 1206 (D.C. 1991) (finding that an employer
who fired her employee for poor performance told him that he was being laid off in
order to protect his feelings); see also McCormick, supra note 15, at 179 n.76 (noting
strategic but nondiscriminatory reasons why an employer might provide a false reason
for its action).
70 Some writers have argued that such a conclusion (that a lie was for benign
reasons) is unlikely. See, e.g., Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantlingof McDonnell Douglas
v. Green: The High Court Muddies the Evidentiay Waters in CircumstantialDiscrimination
Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REN,. 385, 441 (1994) ("[I]f a plaintiff proves that an employer's
proffered reason for its actions is false, most jurors will logically infer that the proffered reason is a cover-up for discrimination."); Malamud, supra note 6, at 2243 n.49
("Rarely can it be envisioned that a jury, as factfinder, will hold for a lying defendantemployer, except in that exceptional case where it is established at trial that the
pretextual reason is a cover-up for say an embarrassing one, rather than a discriminatory one." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The point is not which
conclusion the factfinder would be most likely to draw. The point is merely that a
factfinder might logically make either inference.
71 There are, of course, other types of evidence that might let a factfinder infer
that the defendant is engaged in a cover-up. For example, if the employer proffers a
reason for its action that is so nonsensical that no reasonable employer would utilize
such a criteria in decisionmaking (such as claiming to have fired the plaintiff for
being a stamp collector or because of the plaintiffs zodiac sign), the factfinder might
conclude that the proffered reason, even if true, was a cover-up. Or if the employer
does not apply its rule uniformly (such as firing only some of the employees who were
caught stealing), the factfinder may conclude that the proffered reason, even if true,
was a cover-up. However, these two forms of evidence would not be pretext evidence
in the true sense of the word, as they do not involve inferences of dishonesty based on
the falsity of the proffered reason. See infra note 76 (discussing the proper use of the
term "pretext").
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pie, the employer may have wanted to hire his own cousin. Or the
employer may have wanted to get rid of the employee to prevent the
discovery or disclosure of some type of corporate wrongdoing. While
such a firing might be reprehensible, or even actionable under other
doctrines, 72 it would not be discriminatory. 73 If the factfinder drew
this inference, the pretext process would be at an end. Alternatively,
the factfinder might conclude that the employer lied to cover up a
discriminatory decision. That is, the factfinder might find
74
discrimination.
Thus, McDonnell Douglas works to prove discriminatory causation
through a chain of permissive inferences. 75 This chain can be
depicted as follows:
72 This type of firing would likely be actionable under most states' doctrine of
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 108 (Colo. 1992) (holding that claims for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy are cognizable in Colorado and cover situations where an
employee is terminated for refusing to follow a superior's order to make a false statement to a federal agency); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385,
388-89 (Conn. 1980) (holding that an employee who was fired for insisting his
employer comply with a state statute had a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge); see also Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (stating
that "[a] n employer's right to discharge an employee at will carries a correlative duty
not to discharge an employee who declines to perform an act that would require a
violation of a clear mandate of public policy"); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335
N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (holding that "[a] wrongful discharge is actionable
when the termination clearly contravenes the public welfare and gravely violates paramount requirements of public interest").
73 See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993) (holding that a
decision to fire the plaintiff to prevent his pension from vesting, while reprehensible,
and possibly illegal under other laws, was not age discrimination).
74 There is some debate over whether instructions on pretext should be
mandatory or whether such instructions should be left to trial judges' discretion. See
Vollmer, supra note 66, at 410-13. Given the confusion that seems to surround this
chain of inferences, an instruction on pretext that mirrors the discussion in this subpart would likely be helpful. Note that this issue-whether juries should be given
pretext instructions-is distinct from the issue of whether juries should be instructed
about the three stages of McDonnell Douglas. Most courts have held that juries should
never be instructed about the three stages of McDonnell Douglas. See William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It Is Not Time to Jettison
McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 361, 381 & n.91 (1998) (noting that
courts are divided on whether to instruct juries on McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting); Sandra F. Sperino, RecreatingDiversity in Employment Law by Debunking the Myth of
the McDonnell Douglas Monolith, 44 Hous. L. REv. 349, 376-77 & nn.132-33 (2007)
(same).
75 It might be argued that McDonnell Douglas' chain of inferences runs afoul of
the rule against piling "inference upon inference" in order to prove a fact. See, e.g.,
Interlake Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 129, 133 (7th Cir. 1942). However, this rule
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does not preclude the three sequential inferences in the McDonnell Douglaschain. No
one appears to have criticized McDonnell Douglas on these grounds. And most modern courts and writers accept that inference may be piled upon inference if all of the
inferences in the chain are sound. See, e.g., NLRB v. Camco, Inc., 340 F.2d 803, 811
(5th Cir. 1965) ("The so-called rule against pyramiding inferences, if there really is
such a 'rule' and if it is anything more than an empty pejorative, is simply legalese
fustian to cover a clumsy exclusion of evidence having little or no probative value."
(citing I JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 41, at 434-36
(3d ed. 1940))). In most modern cases that purport to apply the "inference upon
inference" prohibition, there was no clear evidence that the defendant's proffered
reason was wrong-i.e., no evidence of pretext. See, e.g., Cline v. BWXT-Y12, L.L.C.,
No. 304-CV-588, 2007 WL 1227482, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 24, 2007); Schmidt v.
Chao, No. 04-892(RMC), 2006 WL 1663389, at *5 (D.D.C. June 13, 2006); Anderson
v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 03C7589, 2006 WL 931699, at *9, *12 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
6, 2006); see also infra note 76 (discussing the meaning of pretext). No court appears
to have dismissed a claim under the "inference upon inference" rule where the plaintiff has offered evidence that the proffered reason is wrong.

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:1

This chain of permissive inferences can be thought of as the "pretext"
76
method of proof.
This chain of permissive inferences-from error, to lie, to coverup, to discrimination-is similar to inferences that are routinely used
in other parts of the law. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Reeves
76 Note that this use of the word "pretext" differs from three common ways in
which this word tends to be used. First, several writers use the word to describe one of
the links in the chain of inferences, as opposed to the entire chain. For example,
some writers define pretext as a lie; others define it as a cover-up. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973) ("coverup"); Turner v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977) (describing discrimination as
"the use, by employers, of legitimate reasons for action to hide racial animus in decision making"), overruled by Burdine v. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 647 F.2d 513 (5th
Cir. 1981); McCormick, supra note 15, at 177 n.69 ("The courts usually define pretext
as a lie."). In terms of describing a method of proof, these writers' definitions are
flawed. As we have seen, none of the links in the chain of inferences, standing by
itself, proves discrimination (except for the final link, discrimination-but defining
pretext as discrimination would result in a tautology: the plaintiff could prove discrimination by proving discrimination). See supra Part I.C.1. It is the entire chain that
proves discrimination. Thus, "pretext" as a method of proof is best understood as
referring to the entire chain.
Second, some writers use the word "pretext" to include a reason that, while true,
was not the employer's "real" or "actual" reason for its action. See Kaminshine, supra
note 14, at 42; Zimmer, supra note 11, at 1925. This usage does not make sense in the
context of McDonnell Douglas. While such a post hoc search for a true-but-not-"real"
justification might be a "pretext" in the colloquial sense of the word, it would not be
the type of pretext which would permit a plaintiff to prove discrimination using the
McDonnell Douglas pretext method. This is because if the employer's stated reason is
true (irrespective of whether it was the employer's "real" reason)-that is, if there is
no error in the stated reason-then the factfinder cannot find a lie based on the
error, and therefore cannot proceed down the McDonnellDouglas chain of inferences.
This is not to say that the plaintiff might not still be able to prove that the employer's
stated reason is not its real reason and that its real reason is discriminatory. It is only
to say that the plaintiff will not be able to make this showing by proving that the
employer's stated reason is false-that is, by the pretext method of proof. See infra
Part III.D.1.
Finally, several writers-and occasionally the Court-have used the word "pretext" to refer to the entire third stage of McDonnell Douglas. See, e.g., Tex. Dep't of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Chambers, supra note 8, at 85;
CatherineJ. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy of the "PretextPlus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 65-66 (1991);

Malamud, supra note 6, at 2234. This is actually a misnomer. At the third stage, there
are two ways that the plaintiff can proceed, only one of which involves "pretext." At
that stage, the plaintiff can proceed either by (1) proving that the defendant's proffered reason is "unworthy of credence" (the pretext method), or by (2) showing that
discrimination was the "real" reason (presumably using some method of proof other
than the "pretext" method). See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; see also Green, supra note 4,
at 984-85, 988 (noting that there are two ways to proceed at the third stage).
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v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,7 7 the pretext analysis in McDonnell
Douglas is a direct application of "the general principle of evidence
law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty
about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt. ' 7 8 This analysis
also mirrors familiar principles in criminal law that a factfinder may
infer guilt from the fact that a defendant offered a false exculpatory
statement or ran from the scene of the crime. 79 Like McDonnell Douglas, these commonly applied principles are all based on chains of
inference that reflect the concept of pretext.
In summary, McDonnell Douglas works through a chain of permissive inferences. At each link in the chain, the factfinder can-but is
not required to-go to the next link. The final link, or inference, is
discrimination.80
77

530 U.S. 133 (2000).

78

See Id. at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wilson v. United

States, 162 U.S. 613, 620-21 (1896); 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 278(2), at 133 (J. Chadbourn ed., 1979)).
79 See Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 57 F.3d 193, 200 (2d Cir. 1995)
("Resort to a pretextual explanation is, like flight from the scene of a crime, evidence
indicating consciousness of guilt, which is, of course, evidence of illegal conduct.");
Brodin, supra note 64, at 202 ("The concept of pretext... reflects our experience
with evasive explanations offered by those accused of wrongdoing, such as the frequent use of 'consciousness of guilt' evidence in criminal cases and 'consciousness of
liability' evidence in civil cases."); see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1390
(2d Cir. 1997) (Winter, J., dissenting) (referencing the "vast body of law allowing
inferences of consciousness of guilt to be drawn from dishonest behavior concerning
facts material to litigation" (citing United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 227 (2d Cir.
1994); 1 EDWARD J. DEVITr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.06
(4th ed. 1987); 1

LEONARD

B.

SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERALJURY INSTRUCTIONS

§ 6.05

(Instruction 6-11) (1996))). Other similar examples of the general principle include
factfinders' ability to infer guilt from: use of a false name, fabrication of an alibi, use
of disguised handwriting, falsification of evidence, intimidation of witnesses, and
engaging in clandestine behavior. See id.
McDonnell Douglas' pretext analysis also finds support in a slightly different principle regarding veracity: where a party has lied about one issue (such as why the plaintiff was fired), a factfinder may (but need not) choose to disbelieve that party's
testimony on other issues (such as whether he discriminated against the plaintiff). See
id.

80 This understanding of McDonnell Douglas as a chain of permissive inferences
should serve to resolve two longstanding debates in disparate treatment law. First,
this understanding resolves the so-called "pretext-plus" debate. This debate involves
the effect of proving pretext. Once a plaintiff has proven pretext, has she created a
jury question on the issue of causation? Or do plaintiffs also need to produce some
evidence in addition to evidence of pretext-"plus" evidence-to create a jury question? The Court has now held that, most of the time, pretext evidence is sufficient; but
sometimes additional evidence might be required. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48.
Because Reeves did not offer much guidance on when additional "plus" evidence is
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required, lower courts have (predictably) split on the issue. See Steven H. Adelman et
al., Summary Judgment StandardsFollowingReeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products and
Its Progeny, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND

301, 317 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, Sept. 15-17, 2005) available at WLSL021 ALI-ABA 301 (noting post-Reeves split on "pretext plus" issue); Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext Cases, 61
LA. L. REV. 539, 547-48 (2001) (same); AudreyJ. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in
STATE COURTS,

Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 496 n.91 (2005)

(same). From the analysis in the text, we can see that, as a general matter, proof that
the defendant's proffered reason was wrong is sufficient to permit an inference of
discrimination-and thus to survive summary judgment. From the evidence of error,
the factfinder can infer a lie; from a lie, a cover-up; and from a cover-up, discrimination. There might be cases in which a defendant offers evidence that might tend to
push the factfinder off this chain of inferences. For example, the defendant might
offer evidence that its error was a good faith mistake. However, in most cases, this
would simply present a factual question for the jury: was the error a good faith mistake or a lie? A plaintiff could offer additional evidence that the defendant lied. But
the plaintiff would not need to do so to create a question of fact on the issue. Of
course, if the defendant offered evidence of good faith mistake (or a lie for a benign
reason, or a cover-up for a nondiscriminatory reason) that no reasonable factfinder
could reject, then McDonnell Douglaswould not permit an inference of discrimination.
In such a case, to survive summary judgment, the plaintiff would need to offer evidence of discrimination other than McDonnell Douglas evidence. While this could be
called "plus" evidence, that would be a misnomer. In such a case, this non-McDonnell
Douglas evidence would be the plaintiff's only evidence of discrimination.
The second debate that should be cleared up by understanding McDonnell Douglas as a chain of permissive inferences is the ongoing academic debate over whether
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks was correctly decided. In Hicks, the Court held that

proof of pretext does not compel a verdict for the plaintiff. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). This holding gave rise to a firestorm of criticism,
with one of the primary complaints being that a finding of "pretext" logically required
a finding of discrimination. See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 15, at 1209-24; Michael
Selmi, Proving IntentionalDiscrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO.

L.J. 279, 329-34 (1997). See generally Corbett, supra note 6, at 342-58 (discussing the
burdens on the plaintiff). The flaw in this reasoning is that, depending on what one
means by "pretext," a finding of pretext does not necessarily require a finding of
discrimination. If, by "pretext," the critics of Hicks mean only one of the earlier links
in the chain (e.g., error, a lie, or a cover-up), such a finding does not logically require
a finding of discrimination. Each successive link is permissive. A reasonable
factfinder can, for example, find error, or even a lie or cover-up, and still not find
discrimination. If, on the other hand, the critics define "pretext" as the last link in
the chain of inferences (discrimination), then their argument is merely a tautology:
where a plaintiff proves discrimination, a factfinder must find discrimination. In
other words, despite the firestorm of criticism that has been leveled against it, Hicks
was correctly decided-at least as a doctrinal matter. For other, normative criticisms
of Hicks, see, e.g., Derum & Engle, supra note 8, at 1224-25 (discussing Hicks as a

"personal animosity" case); Donna G. Goldian, New Reason to Lie: The End of Proving
DiscriminatoryIntent by Proving Pretext Only After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 30
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 699, 715 (1994) (arguing that Hicks encourages courts to scour
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How McDonnell Douglas Does Not Work (by Process of
Elimination)

This analysis differs significantly from the way in which many
courts and commentators have characterized McDonnell Douglas.
Many writers have insisted that McDonnell Douglas works by a process
of elimination. 8' That is, they believe that McDonnell Douglas works by
progressively eliminating nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged action, until the only possible remaining reason is discrimination. 82 As a result, these writers mistakenly tend to believe that
McDonnell Douglas proves "but for" causation. 83 These writers are
wrong; McDonnell Douglas does not work by a process of elimination.
(And, as we will see in the following section, McDonnell Douglas does
84
not prove "but for" causation.)
the record to find a nondiscriminatory reason to support defendants); Stephen Plass,
Truth: The Lost Virtue in Title VII Litigation, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 599, 602, 609-11
(1998) (arguing that Hicks rewards lying); Kristen T. Saam, Rewarding Employers' Lies:
Making Intentional Discrimination Under Title VII Harder To Prove, 44 DEPAUL L. REv.
673, 704-06 (1995) (same).
81 See, e.g., Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 10-11 & n.45; Lanctot, supra note 76, at
117 (noting that if the factfinder disbelieves a proffered reason, the only remaining
reason is discrimination); McCormick, supra note 15, at 162; Sullivan, supra note 21,
at 934-35 ("Getting to a single discriminatory motive by process of elimination is the
core of McDonnell Douglas ....); Zimmer, supra note 11, at 1933; Robert S. Whitman,
Note, Clearing the Mixed-Motive Smokescreen: An Approach to Disparate Treatment Under

Title VII, 87

MICH.

L. REv. 863, 884 (1989) ("The three-stage inferential inquiry is a

process of elimination . . . .").

In this, these writers have been aided in their confu-

sion by the Court, which has at times suggested that McDonnell Douglas works by process of elimination. See, e.g.,
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 ("[O]nce the employer's
justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation .

. . .");

Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)

("[Wlhen all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as
possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer,
who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race." (emphasis omitted)).
82 This description-in which discrimination is the only possible remaining reason-is the strong version of the process-of-elimination argument. This strong version of the process-of-elimination argument is the only version relevant to the issue of
"but for" causation. There is also a weaker version of the process-of-elimination argument, in which many-but not all-nondiscriminatory reasons are eliminated.
Under the weak version, discrimination is not the only possible remaining reason; but
depending on one's assumptions it might be the most likely remaining reason. This
weak version of the process-of-elimination argument will be addressed below in Part
III.C.
83 See supra note 81.
84

See infra Part I.C.3.
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It is true that the first stage of McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie
case, serves to eliminate some of the most common nondiscriminatory
reasons for adverse employment actions, such as a lack of objective
qualifications (e.g., lack of a required license), or a decision not to fill
ajob. 85 It is also true that in the third stage the plaintiff may eliminate
another potential nondiscriminatory reason: the one proffered by the
defendant.8 6 Finally, it is true that if the factfinder stays on the pretext chain to find discrimination, it will have eliminated three potential nondiscriminatory explanations for the falsity of the proffered
reason (a good faith mistake, a lie for a benign reason, and a cover-up
of something other than discrimination) .87
However, a plaintiff who successfully uses McDonnell Douglas to
prove discrimination does not eliminate all nondiscriminatory reasons
for the challenged action. Such a plaintiff has proven discrimination
by proving that one reason proffered by the defendant was false and a
cover-up for discrimination. This does not rule out the possibility that
the defendant had other reasons which were not discriminatory. This
is important because, as we will see shortly, it means that McDonnell
Douglas does not necessarily prove "but for" causation.8 8
To understand this, consider the following example. Suppose
that in a race discrimination case the defendant claimed to have based
its decision to fire the plaintiff on two nondiscriminatory factors: poor
performance on a project and excessive tardiness. And suppose that
the plaintiff proves that one of those reasons (poor performance on
the project) was incorrect, but fails to prove that the second reason
(excessive tardiness) was incorrect; that is, suppose that the plaintiff
was excessively tardy. Based on the fact that the first proffered reason
(poor performance) was erroneous, the factfinder might proceed
down the McDonnell Douglas chain of inferences to find discrimination. The factfinder might find that the claim of poor performance
was a lie, a cover-up, and designed to conceal discrimination. But the
factfinder might nevertheless conclude that the plaintiff was excessively tardy. 89
85 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (noting that
in a failure-to-hire case, a prima facie case includes proof that plaintiff was objectively
qualified for the job and that the job remained open).
86 See id. at 804-05.
87 See supra Part I.C.1.
88 See infra Part I.C.3.
89 I make no claim about the likelihood of such a scenario. It may be that
factfinders are inclined completely to believe or completely to disbelieve a defendant.
Thus, if the factfinder found one proffered reason (performance) to be false, it might
well be inclined to find the other proffered reason (tardiness) to be false. Or if the

2007]

RECLAIMING

MCDONNELL

DOUGLAS

Thus, the pretext method, even when used successfully, eliminates only one proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
decision. It does not eliminate all potential nondiscriminatory reasons. 90 McDonnell Douglas does not work by process of elimination. It
proves causation by setting up a chain of permissive inferences.9 1
factfinder found one proffered reason (tardiness) to be true, it might be inclined to
find the other proffered reason (performance) to be true-or, at the very least, be
disinclined to find any error in this reason to be a lie or a cover-up. My point, rather,
is that it is possible that the factfinder might believe one proffered reason and disbelieve another; the fact that a plaintiff proves one proffered reason to be a pretext for
discrimination does not necessarily eliminate all potential nondiscriminatory reasons
for the challenged action.
90 Below, I will address the possibility of a strong version of McDonnell Douglas,in
which the plaintiff disproves not just one proffered reason, but all proffered reasons.
See infra Part I.C.4. This strong version would, in fact, eliminate all potential nondiscriminatory reasons. However, even here, it is not the elimination of all nondiscriminatory reasons that gives rise to the inference of discrimination. Rather, it is the fact
that the factfinder concludes that at least one reason was erroneous, and that the
error was a lie and a cover-up for discrimination. A factfinder could, for example,
conclude that all of the defendant's multiple proffered reasons were wrong and still
conclude that all of those errors were good faith mistakes. Moreover, as I will discuss
below, current law could never require such a strong version of McDonnell Douglas.
See infra Part I.C.4.

91 The fact that McDonnell Douglas does not work through a process of elimination casts the first stage of the framework-the plaintiffs prima facie case-in a new,
and diminished, light. The prima facie case eliminates some common reasons for
adverse employment decisions, such as the plaintiffs lack of objective qualifications
or the employer's lack of need to fill the position. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (noting that a Title VII plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case of racial discrimination in hiring "by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for ajob for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open"). It is therefore not surprising that
many writers have seen this stage as a critical first step in a process of elimination. See,
e.g., Sheila R. Foster, Causation in AntidiscriminationLaw: Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41

Hous. L. REV. 1469, 1504-05 (2005); MichaelJ. Zimmer, Leading by Example: An Holistic Approach to Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 177, 177
(2001). But once we understand that McDonnell Douglas does not work by a process of
elimination, the significance of the prima facie case is severely diminished. Eliminating a few common potential reasons for the challenged action does little, if anything,
to prove discrimination. If one of the common reasons was a reason that the defendant professed to rely upon, then the defendant would presumably proffer that reason and the factfinder would need to determine if that reason was a true reason. If
the common reason was not a reason that the defendant professed to rely upon, it
would be irrelevant to the pretext analysis. So eliminating common reasons is only
relevant to the pretext method if one of those reasons also happens to be one of the
defendant's proffered reasons. See Michael J. Hayes, That PerniciousPop-Up, the Prima
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What McDonnell Douglas Proves ("Motivating Factor") and What
It Does Not Prove ("But For")

We now understand exactly how McDonnell Douglas works-and
how it does not work. The next question is what it does-and does
not-do. Does it prove "but for" causation, which would justify making it mandatory? Or does it prove something less, making it impossible to justify its mandatory application? The answer is that, contrary
Facie Case, 39

SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 343, 375-76 (2006) (noting that once the employer
identifies the motivating reasons, "speculative" reasons become unnecessary). And in
such a case, the validity of that reason would be tested at the pretext stage. The prima
facie case would merely serve as a needless complication. See Malamud, supra note 6,
at 2243-45 (questioning the evidentiary value of the prima facie case).
If the prima facie case has any value at all, it is as a trigger for forcing an at-will
employer to proffer a reason for its action (the second stage of McDonnell Douglas).
See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557, 561
(2001) ("The mandatory presumption of discrimination that accompanies proof of a
prima facie case is merely a vehicle to coax an LNR [legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason] from the employer, and meant nothing once the employer articulated the
LNR."); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56 (explaining that the point of the second
stage of the framework-and thus that of the prima facie case that triggers the second
stage-is to present a reason for the challenged action and frame the issue in terms of
the veracity of the reason). Absent such compulsion, an at-will employer might simply
stand mute as to the reasons for its actions. In such a case, the plaintiff would not be
able to use the pretext method. If the plaintiff had no other proof of discrimination
(such as statements or comparative evidence), the court might dismiss the claim without making the defendant provide a reason-and without discovery-thus short-circuiting the plaintiff's ability to use the pretext method. So the issue-and the only
issue-addressed by the prima facie case is simply when a court should compel an atwill employer to proffer a reason for its actions, which might enable the plaintiff to
use the pretext method against an otherwise silent defendant. Whether it would be
proper to dismiss a claim prior to discovery, and thus prior to any opportunity to
ascertain the defendant's reason absent McDonnell Douglas, probably depends on
one's view of pleading requirements. Such an assessment is beyond the scope of this
Article. Cf Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (holding that
notice pleading applies in antidiscrimination cases); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 3, at 36
("Legal doctrine does not require employers to offer good reasons for their decisions,
but the practicalities of litigation often compel them to do so.").
A corollary of the insignificance of the prima facie case is that courts should
never dismiss cases for failure to state a prima facie case where the defendant nonetheless proffers a reason for its action and the plaintiff has evidence tending to show
that the proffered reason is pretext. See Davis, supra note 15, at 751 n.262 (citing
cases in which this has happened). In such cases, the prima facie case is irrelevant.
Put differently, in cases where the employer proffers a reason for its action without
being required to do so, plaintiffs can prove pretext without the first two stages of
McDonnell Douglas. See id. at 753 (arguing that plaintiffs can prove pretext without
McDonnell Douglas).
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to almost universally held belief,9 2 McDonnell Douglas does not prove
"but for" causation.
There are two reasons for this. First, a factfinder can find discrimination using the McDonnell Douglas pretext method without finding "but for" causation. We can understand this by looking at the last
step in McDonnell Douglas' chain of inferences. In this step, the
factfinder can infer discrimination from the fact of a cover-up. The
possibility of this inference arises because when a person tries to cover
something up, we can infer that the person does so in order to avoid
adverse consequences, such as liability or embarrassment. 93 Discriminatory causation-the fact that the defendant based an employment
decision on a protected factor, such as race or sex-would subject the
defendant to both legal liability and social condemnation. So from
the fact of a cover-up a factfinder might infer that the defendant was
covering up discriminatory causation.
Yet this inference arises irrespective of the level of causationirrespective of whether a protected factor such as race or sex was a
"but for" factor or only a "motivating factor" in the challenged decision. Either type of causation would subject the defendant to legal
liability and social condemnation. The 1991 Act imposes legal liability
for "motivating factor" as well as for "but for" causation. 94 And even
under Price Waterhouse, "motivating factor" causation has serious
adverse consequences for a defendant: this level of causation saddles
the defendant with the burden of proof.95 Moreover, the defendant
would likely face social condemnation for making discriminatory decisions irrespective of the level of causation. It is hard to imagine an
employer accused of discrimination defending itself in the press by
saying that it only engaged in "motivating factor" causation. So a
defendant would have an incentive to cover up "motivating factor" as
well as "but for" discrimination.
Thus, where we see a cover-up, all that a factfinder can infer is
that the employer engaged in some type of discriminatory causationeither "motivating factor" or "but for." The McDonnell Douglas pretext
method provides no way to distinguish which of these levels of causation infected the defendant's decisionmaking. So, effectively, when a
92 See supra note 58.
93 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (indicating that liability attaches upon a
"motivating factor" showing).
95 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074;
see also supra note 30 (noting that the "substantial factor" test for burden-shifting in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence most likely refers to "motivating factor" causation).
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plaintiff proves discriminatory causation using McDonnell Douglas, the
most a factfinder can find is "motivating factor" causation-the less
restrictive of the two standards. 96 In other words, contrary to widespread assumption, McDonnell Douglas proves only "motivating factor"
97
causation, not "but for" causation.
Moreover, there is a second reason why McDonnell Douglas does
not necessarily prove "but for" causation. This is because, as noted
above, McDonnell Douglas does not work by a process of elimination; it
does not eliminate all possible nondiscriminatory reasons. 98
Recall that a plaintiff can prove discrimination using McDonnell
Douglas by disproving one of the defendant's proffered reasons (such
as poor performance) while leaving intact other proffered nondiscriminatory reasons (such as excessive tardiness).9. In such a case, the
record would contain multiple reasons for the defendant's decision:
discrimination, as well as at least one nondiscriminatory reason (tardiness). If a nondiscriminatory reason (such as tardiness) were sufficient-that is, if that reason, standing alone, would have triggered the
challenged decision-then the discriminatory reason could not be a
"but for" cause. The defendant would have reached the same decision based on the nondiscriminatory factor (tardiness). So we could
not say that "but for" the discriminatory factor, the defendant would
have reached a different decision.
Thus, the fact that McDonnell Douglas leaves open the possibility
of a sufficient, nondiscriminatory factor precludes it from proving
"but for" causation. So does the fact that a factfinder can find discrimination based on a cover-up, and the fact that a defendant has an
incentive to cover up "motivating factor" as well as "but for" causation.
In summary, contrary to widespread belief, McDonnell Douglas does
not prove "but for" causation. And if a framework such as McDonnell
Douglas does not prove "but for" causation, the framework can hardly
be said to require "but for" causation-precluding its mandatory
application. 00
96 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
97 As I will demonstrate below, the same can be said for almost all other methods
of proof. See infra notes 183-91 and accompanying text.
98
99

See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra Part I.C.2.

100 Professor Davis tries to argue that McDonnell Douglasdoes not require "but for"
causation on very different grounds. He attempts to argue that (1) many of the writers who believe that McDonnell Douglas requires "but for" causation base their reasoning on the language of Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1992), which states
that plaintiffs must show "determinative factor" causation, and (2) the Justices who
wrote Hazen Paper, despite using the phrase "determinative factor," did not really
intend to require "but for" causation. See Davis, supra note 6, at 895-900. Though
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A Strong Version of McDonnell Douglas

There is a version of McDonnell Douglas that would prove "but for"
causation. We can refer to it as the strong version of McDonnell
Douglas.
So far, we have been talking about a basic version of McDonnell
Douglas, in which the plaintiff sets up a chain of permissive inferences
by disproving a reason-a single reason-that the defendant proffered for its action. Disproof of this single reason permits an inference of a lie, which permits an inference of a cover-up, which permits
an inference of discriminatory causation. 1 1
However, we can imagine a strong version of McDonnellDouglas in
which two additional conditions are met. First, suppose that instead
of disproving a single proffered reason, the plaintiff disproved all of
the defendant's proffered reasons. (This might be because the defendant proffered only a single reason, or it might be because the plaintiff disproved all of a set of multiple reasons proffered by the
defendant.)102

Second, suppose that the factfinder concludes that

each of the discredited reasons was a pretext for discrimination. That
is, suppose that the factfinder does not believe that the employer
made an honest mistake, told a lie for a benign reason, or was coverProfessor Davis reaches the correct result (that McDonnell Douglas does not require
"but for" causation), his argument is not completely persuasive. First, whatever the
Justices who wrote Hazen Paper may have intended by the phrase "determinative factor," this phrase means "but for." See Katz, supra note 30, at 501-03 (noting that
"determinative factor" means "but for" causation); Stonefield, supra note 64, at
115-16 (noting that "but for" causation in tort law takes the form of a "determinative
factor" requirement in discrimination cases). Second, Hazen Paper did not need to
address-and thus should not be seen as addressing-causal standards. The case did
not involve claims of multiple independent reasons, such as tardiness and poor performance on a particular project; rather, the plaintiffs claim was that the single reason asserted by the defendant (time until retirement) was in fact dependent on-i.e.,
influenced by-age. See Hazen Paper,507 U.S. at 611-12. Thus, there was no need, at
least at that stage of the case, to decide the appropriate standard of causation. Finally,
many of those who believe that McDonnell Douglas requires "but for" causation believe
this independently of Hazen Paper. For example, many writers believe that McDonnell
Douglas requires "but for" causation because they believe that it is based on a process
of elimination or because they believe that it presents an either-or paradigm. See
supra note 81; infra note 248. Although both of these beliefs turn out to be incorrect,
see supra Part I.C.2; infra Part III.D.1, trying to recast Hazen Paperis not a productive
way to refute writers whose beliefs are not based on that case.
101

See supra Part I.C.1.

102 The set of proffered reasons can easily be limited by the plaintiff's counsel
asking that all-important question: "Is there any other reason for your decision?"

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 83:1

ing up something other than discrimination. If these two conditions
10 3
are satisfied, then the plaintiff will have proven "but for" causation.
Causal logic demonstrates why such a strong version of McDonnell
Douglas would prove "but for" causation. The only way that a factor
(such as race) can be a "motivating factor" in an employment decision, yet not rise to the level of "but for" causation, is where there is a
second, independently sufficient factor (such as excessive tardiness)
in the employer's decision. 10 4 Because the employer would have
reached the same decision as a result of the second, independently
sufficient factor (tardiness), the first factor (race) cannot be a "but
for" cause of the decision. Thus, it is the existence of a second, independently sufficient factor that permits a factor to be a "motivating
factor" but not a "but for" cause.
The strong version of McDonnell Douglas eliminates the possibility
of a second, independently sufficient factor, and thus the possibility
that discrimination could be found to be a "motivating factor" yet not
a "but for" cause of the challenged decision. In the strong version,
(1) all of the reasons proffered by the defendant have been rejected,
and (2) all of the inferences other than discrimination that could
have been drawn from the evidence (such as honest mistake, lies for
benign reasons, or cover-ups for things other than discrimination)
have been rejected. 10 5 In such a case, there could be no evidence of a
second factor (much less a second, independently sufficient factor) in
the record. Such a record would permit an inference of discrimination, but not an inference of "motivating factor" discrimination. It
would permit only an inference of "but for" discrimination. 0 6
103

Dean Kaminshine asserts that McDonnell Douglas does prove "but for" causa-

tion. Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 18. His analysis assumes this strong version of
McDonnell Douglas. See id. However, as will be discussed below, no court could
require this strong version under current law.

104 Actually, there could be an independently sufficient set of factors. For simplicity, I will assume only a single independently sufficient factor. The analysis is the
same.
105 As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that a factfinder would find that (1) the
first proffered reason was a cover-up for discrimination, and (2) an additional proffered reason was erroneous, and then go on to find that this error was not a cover-up
for discrimination (e.g., that the defendant made a good faith error regarding the
second proffered reason). However, it is possible. And this possibility introduces the
possibility of a second, independent factor-and thus the possibility of less-than-"but
for" causation. This is why the strong version of McDonnell Douglas requires that each
proffered reason be shown to be a pretext for discrimination, rather than merely
wrong.
106 Note that this strong version of McDonnell Douglas uses an elimination technique to prove "but for" causation. That is, it proves "but for" causation by eliminating other potential reasons besides discrimination for the defendant's action.
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If we always required plaintiffs to use the strong version of McDonnell Douglas (to disprove and establish as a pretext every reason offered
by the defendant), plaintiffs using this method of proof would indeed
prove "but for" causation. And, as we saw above, this might justify a
requirement to use McDonnell Douglas-the strong version. 11 7 The
problem is that the strong version of McDonnell Douglas proves too
much; so much that it could never be required under current disparate treatment law.
To understand this, it is important to distinguish "but for" causation from "sole" causation. In causal logic, there are three types of
causation: (1) minimal causation ("motivating factor"), (2) necessity
("but for"), and (3) sufficiency (which I have not discussed so far,
because it does not appear in current disparate treatment doctrine). 10 8 These three types of causation can be combined to form
causal standards higher (or lower) than a specific type of causation.
For example, instead of requiring necessity ("but for" causation)
alone, the law could conceivably require "necessity and sufficiency";
that is, the law could require that the factor in question be both necessary and sufficient to trigger the event in question. The "necessity and
sufficiency" standard, which is by definition more stringent than
necessity ("but for") alone, has been called "sole" causation. 10 9
Put differently, if discrimination is the "sole" cause of a decision,
it will also be a "but for" cause. But discrimination may be a "but for"
cause without being the "sole" cause. Thus, if the law required a "sole
cause" standard, employers who engaged in only "but for" discrimination would be exonerated.
The key point to recognize for our purposes is that Congress, in
creating disparate treatment law, unequivocally rejected a "sole" cause

However, the elimination does not prove that discrimination was a reason. As noted
above, this is proven by the chain of permissive inferences flowing from proof that
one of the employer's proffered reasons was wrong. See supra Part I.C.2. The elimination only proves the lack of an independently sufficient reason-and thus "but for"
causation once discrimination is established.
107

See supra Part I.B.

108
109

See supra notes 51 and 53.
See Hawkins v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 907 F.2d 697, 704

(7th Cir. 1990) (noting that "necessary and . . . sufficient" is equivalent to "sole

cause"). The logical explanation for this is as follows: If a factor is sufficient, it is
capable of triggering the outcome (here, the adverse employment decision). If a
factor is necessary, that means that there are no other factors that would be sufficient to
cause the outcome. See Katz, supra note 30, at 512-14. So if a factor is necessary and
sufficient, it will be the only factor capable of triggering the outcome-the sole cause.
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standard. 1 10 Thus, one of the few "givens" about causation in disparate treatment law is that the law does not require plaintiffs to prove
"sole" causation.
Yet requiring plaintiffs to use the strong version of McDonnell
Douglas would effectively require them to prove "sole" causation. By
eliminating any possibility of a second factor in the defendant's decision, the plaintiff would prove "sole" causation-the one standard
that Congress has made clear plaintiffs never need to prove. Thus, a
court could never require a plaintiff to use the strong version of
McDonnell Douglas. " 'I At most, a court could require a plaintiff to use
the basic version of McDonnell Douglas. And the basic version proves
2
only "motivating factor" causation-not "but for" causation.'"
5.

The Death of a Mandatory McDonnell Douglas

In summary, a mandatory McDonnell Douglas makes no sense as a
matter of causal logic. To require certain plaintiffs to use McDonnell
Douglas, as opposed to one of the two alternative frameworks, we must
assume that McDonnell Douglas is more demanding than those alternative frameworks. The alternative frameworks require that plaintiffs
prove "motivating factor" causation. So, for it to be mandatory,
McDonnell Douglas would need to require plaintiffs to prove "but for"
causation. It does not. Therefore, McDonnell Douglas should never be
mandatory. Courts should stop requiring unwilling plaintiffs to use
McDonnell Douglas. Now.
110 See 110 CONG. REc. 13,837, 13,837-38 (1964); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 n.7 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Congress specifically rejected

an amendment that would have placed the word 'solely' in front of the words
'because of.'" (citing 110 CONG. REC. 13,837)), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733,
740 & n.4 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson,J., concurring specially) (citing 110 CONG. REC.
13,837-38) (noting the rejection by both the House and Senate of a proposal to add
the word "solely" to the statute); see also Cheryl L. Anderson, What is "Because of the
Disability" Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation,
and the Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 340-41 (2006) (noting

that Congress rejected the "sole cause" requirement in the ADA).
111 This is not to say that a plaintiff could not choose to use the strong version of
McDonnell Douglas-that is, to try to prove that all of the reasons proffered by the
defendant were pretextual. If the plaintiff does so successfully, she would prove "but
for" causation (actually, "sole" causation). Such a showing would preclude the defendant from proving lack of "but for" causation through a "same decision"/"same
action" defense. See infra Part II.A.
112 See supra Part 1.C.3.
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WORLD WITHOUT MANDATORY MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

We now know that McDonnell Douglasshould never be mandatory.
This Part describes what disparate treatment doctrine would look like
in a world without a mandatory McDonnell Douglas. Next, it shows how
this new understanding of the proper role of McDonnell Douglas in
disparate treatment law can be implemented in light of current precedent. Finally, it shows how this new understanding of McDonnell Douglas resolves the three doctrinal debates that have plagued current
disparate treatment law.
A.

The ProperRole for a Nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas

So what would disparate treatment doctrine look like in a world
where McDonnell Douglas is never required? The answer is quite simple: plaintiffs would have the option of choosing to use-or not to
use-McDonnell Douglas to prove causation. In most cases, the choice
would be whether to use the basic version of McDonnell Douglas to
prove "motivating factor" causation. For example, consider a plaintiff
who believes she has been fired because of her sex and sues under the
1991 Act. The Act requires her to prove "motivating factor" causation.113 She could try to do so by using McDonnell Douglas-by attacking her employer's proffered reason for firing her. Or she could try
to do so using other types of evidence that might be available, such as
sexist statements by the decisionmaker. Or she could use multiple
forms of proof.
Put differently, and more conceptually, McDonnell Douglas should
no longer be understood as denoting a particular causal standard
(such as "motivating factor" or "but for" causation). Rather, it should
be understood as nothing more than a method of proof, one method
by which plaintiffs could choose to prove causation.
The proper role for McDonnell Douglas becomes apparent once
we understand the roles it can-and cannot-play. Given that disparate treatment law is based on causation, there are only three possible
roles that a framework such as McDonnell Douglas can play. First, the
framework can specify the standard (or standards) of causation that
must be proven, such as "motivating factor" or "but for." Second, the
framework can allocate the burden for proving a particular causal
standard. Third, the framework can provide a method of proving a
4
particular causal standard." 1
113
114

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
See supra note 56.
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We have seen that McDonnell Douglas provides a method of
proof.'1 5 The problem has been that the framework has also tended
to be seen as something more than a method of proof: it has also
tended to be seen as denoting a substantive standard ("but for") or an
allocation of the burden of proving "but for" causation (to the plaintiff). 116 In light of the conclusion that McDonnell Douglas does not
prove-and thus cannot denote-"but for" causation, 117 these latter
roles make no sense. Thus, McDonnell Douglas should stop being
understood as a substantive causal standard or an allocation of the
burden of proof. It should be understood as a method of proof, and
1 18
nothing more.
In comparison, the alternative frameworks (Price Waterhouse and
the 1991 Act) specify particular causal standards and allocate the burden for proving those standards: the plaintiff must prove "motivating
factor" causation, after which the defendant can try to prove a lack of
115 Many courts and commentators have recognized that McDonnell Douglas is a
method of proof. See, e.g., EEOC v. PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 800-02 (10th Cir.
2007); Brewer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 479 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir. 2007); Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 32; Sullivan, supra note 21, at 931. The problem is that these
courts and commentators have generally seen it as a method of proving "but for"
causation. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. From there, it has been too easy
to see it as requiring "but for" causation.
116 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
117 See supra Part I.C.3.
118 It is possible, I suppose, to use McDonnell Douglas to designate a "motivating
factor" standard of causation or an allocation of the burden of proof to the plaintiff to
prove "motivating factor" causation. However, even this use of McDonnell Douglas
would not make much sense. Using a method of proof to denote the standard that it
proves is unduly narrow. While McDonnell Douglascertainly proves "motivating factor"
causation, there are several other ways to prove the same standard. See infra Part III.E.
So if we want to say that plaintiffs must prove "motivating factor" causation, it is
unduly restrictive to say that they must use McDonnell Douglas. Moreover, using
McDonnell Douglas as a way to require plaintiffs to prove "motivating factor" causation
would fail to distinguish it from Price Waterhouse or the 1991 Act.
It is also possible-even likely-that courts and commentators have intended
McDonnell Douglas to denote a requirement that plaintiffs prove "but for" causation.
See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 278-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071; see also infra Part II.B.2.c (discussing Justice O'Connor's likely intent in
Price Waterhouse). The analysis above shows that it does not make sense to use McDonnell Douglas in this way. This is not to say that the law might not still require certain
plaintiffs to prove "but for" causation. It is merely to say that the law cannot do so by
requiring those plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas. (Below, I will argue that the law
should not and does not require any plaintiffs to prove "but for" causation. See infra
Part II.C.1, particularly text accompanying notes 182-91.)
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"but for" causation.' 1 9 Notably, neither of the alternative frameworks
20
specifies how those causal standards must be proven.
Once we understand that (1) McDonnell Douglas proves causation
but does not specify a causal standard or burden of proof, and (2) the
alternative frameworks (Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act) specify
causal standards and burdens of proof, but do not specify a method of
proof, it becomes easy to see how these frameworks fit together-and
thus the proper role for a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas-the alternative frameworks specify that plaintiffs must prove "motivating factor" causation. McDonnell Douglas provides one way in which plaintiffs
121
may choose to do so.
There is one additional potential use for McDonnell Douglas.
Once the plaintiff proves "motivating factor" causation, the alternative
frameworks (Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act) permit the defendant
to try to show that it would have made the "same decision" or taken
the "same action" anyway-that is, to try to prove a lack of "but for"
119 See Katz, supra note 30, at 501-11 (explaining these frameworks in causal
terms). The difference between the two alternative frameworks is in the effect of
satisfying these burdens. Under Price Waterhouse, liability attaches only at the "but for"
level. Id. at 528. Under the 1991 Act, liability attaches at the "motivating factor" level,
while full damages attach only at the "but for" level. Id. at 530.
120 Arguably, Price Waterhouse does specify how causation must be proven-at least
for some plaintiffs. Justice O'Connor's concurrence states that plaintiffs who do not
have "direct evidence" must use McDonnell Douglas. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
278-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, this statement should be understood
as being about burdens of proof, not methods of proof. Justice O'Connor almost
certainly wanted to ensure that plaintiffs without "direct evidence" would bear the full
burden of proving "but for" causation. See id. (focusing on issue of when a plaintiff
can transfer the burden of proof). She believed that McDonnell Douglas did this. But,
as we have seen above, McDonnell Douglas does not prove "but for" causation. See supra
Part I.C.3. It seems highly unlikely that Justice O'Connor wanted to make plaintiffs
use a method of proof which only proved "motivating factor" causation. A better
understanding is that she wanted to make plaintiffs prove "but for" and did not care
what method of proof they used to do so. See also infra Part II.B.2.c (discussing Justice
O'Connor's likely intent in Price Waterhouse).
121 See Curley v. St. John's Univ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 181, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (suggesting that a plaintiff might use the "pretext" analysis to show that discrimination was
a "motivating factor"); Davis, supra note 15, at 752 ("Discrediting defendant's articulated legitimate reason is indirect proof that discriminatory intent motivated the
defendant. Proof of pretext is, therefore, relevant to and may satisfy the 'motivating
factor' test of the 1991 Act."); see also Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 451 n.* (D.C.
Cir. 2007) ("A plaintiff may also, of course, use evidence of pretext and the McDonnell
Douglas framework to prove a mixed-motive [i.e., "motivating factor"] case."). But see
Davis, supra note 15, at 752 (suggesting-erroneously-that pretext does not necessarily show motivating factor causation).
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causation. 22 While it has long been thought that using McDonnell
23
it
Douglas precludes such a "same decision"/"same action" defense,
does not. This is because, as we saw above, the basic version of McDonnell Douglas proves only "motivating factor" causation, which does not
preclude the possibility that there is less than "but for" causation; the
possibility remains that the defendant would have made the "same
decision" or taken the "same action" absent consideration of the pro124
tected factor (such as race or sex).
This possibility suggests a role for the strong version of McDonnell
Douglas. It is important to remember that (1) the alternative
frameworks place the burden of proof on the defendant on the issue
of "but for" causation, and (2) a plaintiff can never be forced to use
the strong version of McDonnell Douglas.12 5 However, nothing prevents a plaintiff from voluntarily using the strong version of McDonnell
Douglas in an attempt to prove "but for" causation. That is, the plaintiff could endeavor to prove that all of the reasons offered by the
defendant are pretextual. If the plaintiff succeeds in doing so, she will
have proven "but for" causation. 12 6 This proof would preclude the
possibility of a "same decision"/"same action" defense.
In summary, the proper role for McDonnell Douglas is that of a
nonmandatory method of proof. Plaintiffs can choose to use-or not
use-the basic version of McDonnell Douglas as a way to meet their
burden of proving "motivating factor" causation under Price
122 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261- 7 9; see also
Katz, supra note 30, at 501-11 (explaining these frameworks in causal terms).
123 For example, Dean Kaminshine states that the "same action" defense is not
appropriate when a plaintiff uses McDonnell Douglas because he believes that McDonnell Douglas proves "but for" causation, which would make it impossible for a defendant to prove "same action" (a lack of "but for" causation). See Kaminshine, supra
note 14, at 29; see also Fogg, 492 F.3d at 454 (concluding that the "same action"
defense is inapplicable to McDonnell Douglas); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 3, at 45-47
(suggesting that a plaintiff who proves pretext need not worry about a "same action"
defense). This is true if the plaintiff uses the strong version of McDonnell Douglas
(which proves "sole factor" causation, and thus "but for" causation). See supra Part
I.C.4. However, it is not true if the plaintiff uses the basic version of McDonnell Douglas, which proves only "motivating factor" causation. See supra Part I.C.3. Dean
Kaminshine's analysis is correct as to the strong version, which is the one on which he
focuses.
124 See supra Part I.C.3.
125 See supra Part I.C.4.
126 By successfully using the strong version of McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff
would establish "sole causation," which by definition includes "but for" causation
(since "sole factor" means a factor is both sufficient and necessary-a "but for" cause).
See supra Part I.C.4.
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Waterhouse or the 1991 Act. 127 And they can choose to use-or not
use-the strong version of McDonnell Douglas as a way to preclude a
"same decision"/"same action" defense under those two alternative
28
frameworks.1
Note that this view is extremely different from the prevailing view
of McDonnell Douglas. Almost all current writers treat McDonnell Douglas and the alternative frameworks (Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act)
as competing, mutually exclusive frameworks. That is, almost everyone assumes that a court must apply either McDonnell Douglas or one
of the alternative frameworks. 129 But this makes no sense. McDonnell
Douglas and the alternative frameworks are apples and oranges. They
do not do the same thing. The alternative frameworks specify causal
standards ("motivating factor," "but for"), while McDonnell Douglas
does not. McDonnell Douglas provides a method of proving causation,
while the alternative frameworks do not. Thus, McDonnell Douglas
complements, rather than competes with, the alternative frameworks.

127 At least one court has understood this point. See Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d
447, 451 & n.* (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that a plaintiff can use McDonnell Douglas as
one way of proving that discrimination "played a 'motivating part"' in the defendantemployer's decision (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250)); see also Herawi v. Ala.
Dep't of Forensic Scis., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345-46 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (recognizing
that McDonnell Douglas provides "one methodology for establishing liability through
circumstantial evidence" in either "single- or mixed-motive cases").
128 In the text, I have discussed only two causal standards and allocations of burden: Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act. These each require the plaintiff to prove only
"motivating factor" causation, placing the burden of proving "but for" causation (or
lack of it) on the defendant. See supra notes 51-55. It is possible that the law contains
a third causal standard and allocation of burden; one in which the plaintiff bears the
full burden of proving "but for" causation. I will argue below that current law should
not-and does not-include this third causal standard and allocation of burden. See
infra Part II.C.1, particularly text accompanying notes 182-191. However, in the
event that the law did require some plaintiffs to bear the burden of proving "but for"
causation, this subpart shows that they could elect to do so by using the strong version
of McDonnell Douglas.

129 See, e.g., Tysinger v. Police Dep't, 463 F.3d 569, 577-78 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the different approaches courts have taken in deciding which framework to apply
after Desert Palace); Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470, 474-75 (8th Cir. 2005)
(deliberating about which framework to apply and deciding to apply McDonnell Douglas rather than Price Waterhouse or Desert Palace); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490

U.S. 228, 278-79 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,concurring), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (indicating that "the court should
determine whether the McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse framework properly

applies ....");supra note 21 (listing scholars who believe that McDonnell Douglas is
"dead" because of the availability of alternative frameworks after Desert Palace).
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Implementing a Nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas (Without Help
from Congress or the Supreme Court)

We have now seen that McDonnell Douglas should never be
mandatory. And we have seen what disparate treatment law should
look like with a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas. The question
remains: how can we implement this vision? As we saw above, virtually
all courts currendy mandate McDonnell Douglas in certain cases.13 0 So
how can we change this? How can we bring about a nonmandatory
McDonnell Douglas?
Of course, Congress could legislate a proper understanding of
McDonnell Douglas, passing new legislation to clarify that McDonnell
Douglas is merely a method of proof and should never be mandatory.
Or the Supreme Court could grant certiorari in a new disparate treatment case and so hold.1 31 But, as desirable as such a clarifying action
by Congress or the Court might be, neither congressional nor
Supreme Court action is required to implement a nonmandatory
McDonnellDouglas. This is because a nonmandatory McDonnellDouglas
is actually consistent with current Supreme Court precedent. Contrary to popular belief, the Supreme Court has not mandated the use
of McDonnell Douglas-at least not in any way that remains binding
today.
To understand this, it is important to keep in mind that there is
one and only one place where the Supreme Court has said that certain plaintiffs must use McDonnell Douglas-Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Price Waterhouse (which, as noted above, tends to be seen as
controlling). 132 In that opinion, Justice O'Connor said that plaintiffs
who do not have "direct evidence" must use McDonnellDouglas.13 3 But
as the next two sections will argue, Justice O'Connor's concurrence
should no longer be seen as mandating McDonnell Douglas for plaintiffs without "direct evidence." As such, it should not be seen as an
impediment to a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas.
1. Implementing a Nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas in 1991 Act
Cases: Desert Palace Makes It Easy
A nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas is easiest to implement in the
context of the 1991 Act. This is because, in that context, the Supreme
130 See supra Part I.A.
131 As noted above, McDonnell Douglas is a creature of the courts, not Congress.
See supra note 49. Thus, there is no need for congressional action; the Court could
adopt the proper understanding of McDonnell Douglas.
132 See supra note 32.
133 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278-79 (1989).
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Court has made clear thatJustice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence is no longer good law: in Desert Palace, the Court held unequivocally that even plaintiffs without "direct evidence" can use the 1991
Act framework; they are not forced to use McDonnell Douglas.134 Thus,
in the 1991 Act context, there is no impediment to a nonmandatory
McDonnell Douglas.
That being said, some courts have managed to find new and creative ways (a euphemism) to require certain plaintiffs to use McDonnell
Douglas in 1991 Act cases-even without Justice O'Connor's "direct
evidence" rule. One group of courts requires plaintiffs to present a
"mixed motive" case (whatever that might be) to avoid McDonnell
Douglas and instead use the 1991 Act framework. 1 35 Another group of
courts requires all plaintiffs to use a "modified" version of McDonnell
Douglas.'3 6 These two creative approaches, both of which mandate
the use of McDonnell Douglas in 1991 Act cases, threaten the imple137
mentation of McDonnell Douglas' proper role.
134 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
135 See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Scott & Chapman, supra note
21, at 405 (arguing that 1991 Act framework should only apply in "mixed motive"
cases). The issue of how to define a "mixed motive" case is significant. See infra note
142 (noting that there is no good definition for a "mixed motive" case for purposes of
mandating the use of McDonnell Douglas).
136 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. This modified version mimics the
standard version of McDonnell Douglas at the first two stages (the plaintiffs prima facie
case and the defendant's proffered reason). But at the third stage, the modified version offers the plaintiff a choice: the plaintiff can prove either (1) that the proffered
reason was pretextual (the "pretext alternative," just like the standard version of
McDonnell Douglas), or (2) "that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the
reasons for its conduct, and another 'motivating factor' is the plaintiffs protected
characteristic" (the "mixed motive alternative"). See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.,
376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F.
Supp. 2d 854, 865 (M.D.N.C. 2003)). If the plaintiff chooses the mixed motive alternative, the defendant can try to prove a "same action" defense to limit damages. See
id.
137 Proponents of the "modified" McDonnell Douglas approach might argue that it
is harmless, since at the third stage it lets plaintiffs choose between the traditional
McDonnell Douglas pretext method and the 1991 Act framework. However, there are
two flaws with this choice. First, it does not give litigants any choice about the first two
stages. Under the "modified" framework, all plaintiffs must prove a prima facie case
and all defendants must proffer a nondiscriminatory reason. While neither of these
steps is onerous, see supra note 63 and accompanying text, they may well present
unnecessary hurdles. See Davis, supra note 15, at 751 n.262 (citing cases where plaintiffs with pretext evidence have had their cases dismissed for failure to present a
prima facie case); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203,
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Fortunately, these two creative approaches can probably be
rejected with relative ease. No federal statute or Supreme Court case
requires-or supports-either of these two approaches, 138 and among
the federal courts of appeals, only one circuit (the Fifth) has adopted
either of these approaches. 1 9 So, at the very least, courts outside the
Fifth Circuit are free to reject these two approaches. Furthermore,
the fact that the Fifth Circuit has adopted both of these mutually
exclusive approaches would seem to undercut the authority for either
one of those approaches even within that circuit.140 (The Fifth Circuit
can-and should-reconsider and reject both of these approaches en
banc.)
And these two creative approaches should be rejected. As
denonstrated above, it makes no sense to require any plaintiff to use
McDonnell Douglas.14 1 Ever. The fact that the "direct evidence"
requirement is gone in the 1991 Act cases means that one method for
getting it wrong-one method for mandating the use of McDonnell
Douglas-is no longer available. Replacing that one method for getting it wrong with a new method for getting it wrong ("mixed motives"
12
or a mandatory "modified" McDonnell Douglas) is just plain foolish. 4
228-37 (1993) (giving examples of plaintiffs burden); see also Malamud, supranote 6,
at 2282-301 (noting that some courts require an excessive showing to make a prima
facie case). Second, and perhaps more problematic, at the third stage of the "modified" McDonnell Douglas, it is a serious overstatement to say that plaintiffs have a
choice; that they are truly free to decline to use the traditional McDonnell Douglas
method. This is because plaintiffs can only exercise this option by paying a significant
price: a plaintiff who elects this option must prove "that the defendant's reason, while
true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct." See, e.g., Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312.
That is, to opt out of the traditional McDonnell Douglas approach, the plaintiff must
admit that the defendant's proffered reason is true-a significant admission. See
Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 20 n.99 (noting that plaintiffs would generally not want
to admit that the defendant had a nondiscriminatory motive). So the plaintiff's
"choice" at the third stage of the "modified" McDonnell Douglas framework is somewhat illusory, at least as the "modified" McDonnell Douglas is currently constructed.
138 In a cryptic footnote, Desert Palacereserved the issue of whether a "direct evidence" requirement might apply in "single motive" cases. See Desert Palace,539 U.S. at
94 n.1. However, that case certainly did not mandate the use of McDonnell Douglas in
all "single motive" cases. Moreover, as demonstrated above, it does not make sense to
require the use of McDonnell Douglasin any case-even a "single motive" case without
"direct evidence" (whatever that might be). See supra, Part I.
139 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 47-48 (noting that the Fifth Circuit, in separate opinions,
adopts both approaches).
141
See supra Part I.
142 Moreover, each of these two approaches suffers from its own specific flaws.
The "modified" McDonnell Douglas approach presents plaintiffs with a false dichotomy:
at the third stage, the "modified" McDonnell Douglas requires plaintiffs to choose
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between a method of proof (pretext) and a standard of proof (the 1991 Act standard). See infra Part II.C.3, especially text accompanying notes 203 and 207 (discussing the false dichotomy posed by choice between McDonnell Douglas and alternative
frameworks).
The "mixed motive" approach (requiring plaintiffs without "mixed motive" cases
to use McDonnell Douglas) also suffers from a serious flaw specific to that approach:
there is no good definition of what constitutes a "mixed motive" case. See Fukete v.
Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 335, 337-38 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining confusion surrounding "mixed motive"/"single motive" distinction); Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586,
597 n.9 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). Prior to Desert Palace,most courts and commentators
used the phrase to denote cases in which plaintiffs were required to use McDonnell
Douglas-that is, cases in which the plaintiff did not have "direct evidence." See, e.g.,
Haddon v. Executive Residence at the White House, 313 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2002). However, after Desert Palace,this conclusory definition is not available. Most of
the post-Desert Palace courts that have adopted the "mixed motive" approach have
defined the phrase by reference to an admission by the plaintiff: a "mixed motive"
case is one in which the plaintiff admits that the defendant has legitimate, as well as
illegitimate, motives. See, e.g., Winter v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-1591-L,
2003 WL 23200278, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2003); see also Scott & Chapman, supra
note 21, at 405 (providing alternative definition, in which one alternative requires the
plaintiff to "prove" that the defendant had two motives, one of which was legitimate).
However, this is a silly definition. As noted above, no plaintiff in his or her right mind
would want to concede this point. See supra note 137. Moreover-and more importantly-there is no reason to think that Congress intended to limit the 1991 Act
framework to plaintiffs who were willing to make such a damaging concession. Other
writers have tried to define "mixed motive" cases by reference to an admission by the
defendant: a "mixed motive" cases is one in which the defendant concedes that it had
an illegal motive, as well as a legal one. See Scott & Chapman, supra note 21, at 405
(providing alternative definition, in which one alternative involves a concession by the
defendant that it had an illegal motive). However, this definition is also silly. Again,
few defendants would seem likely to want to make such a concession. And again,
there is no reason to think that Congress intended to limit the 1991 Act framework to
cases involving defendants who were foolish, particularly honest, or had been caught
red-handed and so had no alternative but to admit that they had an illegal motive.
Assuming that one needed a definition of "mixed motive" for some purpose-which
is far from clear-the best definition is probably this: a case in which the factfinder
might reasonably conclude that more than one factor influenced the defendant's
decision. Presumably, the plaintiff would provide evidence of illegal factors and the
defendant would provide evidence of legal factors. While this definition is workable,
it could not serve as a way to mandate the use of McDonnell Douglas. As noted above,
McDonnell Douglaspresents only one of many ways that the plaintiff might try to show
that an illegal factor influenced the defendant's decision. See supra Part II.A.
The corollary of the workable definition of "mixed motive" is that a "single
motive" case would be one in which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that only
one factor, either legitimate or illegitimate, influenced the defendant's decision.
Some McDonnell Douglas cases-those in which the defendant offers only one legitimate reason for its decision, which the factfinder must either believe or disbelievemay result in such a record. But the fact that some McDonnell Douglas cases may present "single motive" cases is hardly a reason to require McDonnellDouglas in all "single
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Implementing a Nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas Outside the
1991 Act: Dealing with the "Direct Evidence" Distinction

In cases outside of the 1991 Act, Justice O'Connor's Price
Waterhouse concurrence presents a greater impediment to a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas. This is because Desert Palace's rejection of
that concurrence was arguably limited to 1991 Act cases. The Desert
Palace opinion was based almost entirely on the text and legislative
history of the 1991 Act. 1 43 So it is difficult to argue that Desert Palace
wiped out Justice O'Connor's Price Waterhouse concurrence in non1991 Act cases. For this reason, most courts in non-1991 Act cases
apply Justice O'Connor's concurrence-and mandate McDonnell
Douglasfor plaintiffs without "direct evidence.' 1 4 4 However, Desert Palace is not necessary for a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas. We can
make three arguments that lower courts should treat McDonnell Douglas as nonmandatory in non-1991 Act cases, none of which depend on
Desert Palace.
a.

Congressional Intent

The first argument for allowing lower courts in non-1991 Act
cases to treat McDonnell Douglas as nonmandatory involves congressional intent. The argument is that Congress never intended to
require plaintiffs without "direct evidence" in non-1991 Act cases to
use McDonnell Douglas.
There is good evidence for this. In looking at the text and legislative history of disparate treatment statutes outside of the 1991 Act,
such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967145
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of

1990,146

there is no

mention of "direct evidence." Nor is there any indication in these
statutes or their legislative history that certain plaintiffs should be
required to use McDonnell Douglas. Thus, there is no legislative
requirement in those statutes that plaintiffs without "direct evidence"
must use McDonnell Douglas.
This analysis is almost identical to that used by the Desert Palace
Court in the context of the 1991 Act. Based on a similar analysis of
the text and legislative history of the 1991 Act, Desert Palace held that
the 1991 Act contains no "direct evidence" requirement. 4 7 The argumotive" cases.

143

See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-102 (2003).

144

See supra Part I.A.

145
146
147

29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 101-02 (2003).
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ment here simply draws the same conclusion from the similar text and
legislative histories of disparate treatment statutes other than the 1991
Act. Notably, some lower courts have already used this analysis to
eradicate the "direct evidence" rule (and stop mandating McDonnell
1 48
Douglas) in non-1991 Act cases.
Of course, the absence of a legislatively imposed "direct evidence" rule does not end the inquiry. If the Supreme Court has
imposed a "direct evidence" requirement, then lower courts would be
bound by that. However, it is far from clear that the Court has
imposed a "direct evidence" rule in non-1991 Act cases.
The only place where the Court has actually imposed a "direct
evidence" requirement is in the subset of cases that have been overruled by the 1991 Act. The "direct evidence" requirement comes
from Price Waterhouse, which interpreted section 703 (a) of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.149 But this interpretation of section
703(a) was expressly overruled by the 1991 Act. According to the
Court, the 1991 Act made clear that there is no "direct evidence"
requirement in cases under section 703(a).1 50 In other words, the
only statute under which the Supreme Court actually required "direct
evidence"-section 703(a)-has been amended by the 1991 Act. In

148 See, e.g.,
Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 334-35 (5th Cir.
2005) (finding that the district court erred in using the McDonnell Douglas framework
to analyze the plaintiffs FMLA claim); Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305,
311-12 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding direct evidence of discrimination unnecessary to
ADEA claims); Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 345 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir.
2003) (ADEA); Strauch v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 301 F. Supp. 2d 839, 844 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (ADEA); Warren v. Terex Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 641, 646 (N.D. Miss. 2004)
(Title VII retaliation claim); Knutson v. Ag Processing, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 961, 995
(N.D. Iowa 2003) (ADEA), rev'd on other grounds, 394 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2005); Skomsky v. Speedway SuperAmerica, L.L.C., 267 F. Supp. 2d 995, 998-1000 (D. Minn.
2003) (ADA); Myers v. AT&T Corp., 882 A.2d 961, 971 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2005) (state law). These courts have not gone on to assign McDonnell Douglas its
proper role. Rachid, for example, required all plaintiffs to use a modified version of
McDonnell Douglas. Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312. But these courts have at least eradicated
the "direct evidence" distinction.
149 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In one
pre-PriceWaterhouse case, the Court indicated that an ADEA plaintiff with "direct evidence" did not need to rely on McDonnell Douglas. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). But the Court did not hold that an ADEA plaintiff without "direct evidence" would have to use McDonnell Douglas. (And Justice
O'Connor was the onlyjustice in Price Waterhouse--four years later-who was inclined
to so hold. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.)
150

See Desert Palace,539 U.S. at 99-101.
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cases under all statutes other than section 703(a)-that is, in non1 51
1991 Act cases-the Court has never required "direct evidence."
After Price Waterhouse, several other courts assumed that Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of section 703(a) applied to other disparate treatment statutes-to non-1991 Act statutes. 152 But the Supreme
Court has never held this. Thus, lower courts remain free to interpret
non-1991 Act statutes and to conclude that these statutes do not
require plaintiffs without "direct evidence" to use McDonnell Douglas.
There is a counterargument which might suggest that Price
Waterhouse (and its "direct evidence" test) does apply in non-1991 Act
cases. Professor Prenkert has appropriately labeled this argument a
"Bizarro statutory stare decisis" argument.1 53 The Bizarro argument
starts with the (sound) premise that Congress generally intends its disparate treatment statutes to be interpreted uniformly.1 54 Thus, the
argument goes, it made sense to apply Price Waterhouse's interpretation
of section 703(a) to other disparate treatment statutes, such as the
ADEA or ADA. 15 5 But this part of the argument would also suggest
151 Because the relevant portion of the 1991 Act amended section 703(a), we can
think of all cases other than those under section 703(a) as non-1991 Act cases. See
supra note 43.
152 See, e.g., EEOC v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co., 364 F.3d 160, 163 n.1 (4th Cir.
2004) (assuming that "direct evidence is still a prerequisite for a mixed-motive analysis in ADEA cases"); Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assurance Co., 359 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir.
2004) (applying the "direct evidence" distinction in an ADEA case); Mereish v.
Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing why the Price Waterhouse "direct
evidence" distinction should remain applicable to ADEA claims after Desert Palace);
Harp v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. Civ.A. 04-2205, 2006 WL 1517390, at *6-7 (E.D. Pa.
May 31, 2006) ("[I]n an ADA action, if direct evidence of discrimination is produced,
the Price Waterhouse framework applies; if circumstantial evidence of discrimination is
produced, the McDonnell Douglas framework applies . . . ."). But see Richardson v.
Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 334-35 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying Desert Palacein
a FMLA case); Rachid, 376 F.3d at 311 (applying the reasoning of Desert Palace in an
ADEA case).
153 SeeJamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEYJ. EMP. &
LAB. L. 217 (2007). Professor Prenkert's article focuses on a different application of
Bizarro statutory stare decisis: the Court's contention that a particular disparate
impact case which, like Price Waterhouse, was overruled by the 1991 Act, should somehow apply in non-1991 Act cases. But the basics of the argument are the same and
clearly apply to Price Waterhouse. See id. at 256-63 (discussing the potential application
of the Bizarro argument to Price Waterhouse).
154 See Martin J. Katz, Unifying DisparateTreatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 2008) (manuscript at 17-18), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=982417 (describing the assumption of uniformity and why it
makes sense).
155 See id. (explaining why the assumption of uniformity justified the expansion of
Price Waterhouse to cases outside of Section 703(a)).
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that, once Congress corrected Price Waterhouse's interpretation of section 703(a), that corrected interpretation would apply to other disparate treatment statutes.' 56 The Bizarro argument avoids this
conclusion by doing a situational about-face on the assumption of uniformity to suggest that, after rejecting Price Waterhouse,Congress somehow decided it wanted its disparate treatment statutes to be
interpreted differently; that Congress wanted to overrule Price
Waterhouse in section 703(a) but leave that case's interpretation in
place in all other disparate treatment statutes-that is, in non-1991
15 7
Act cases.
I argue in a forthcoming article that this Bizarro argument for
the application of Price Waterhouse to non-1991 Act cases is deeply
flawed and should be rejected; Price Waterhouse should not be seen as
controlling law in non-1991 Act cases. 15 8 But if one buys the Bizarro
argument, then Price Waterhouse would apply to non-1991 Act cases. In
that case, the project of abolishing a mandatory McDonnell Douglas
would need to be done within the context of Price Waterhouse. The
following two arguments attempt to do so.
b.

Not the Controlling Opinion

A second argument for allowing lower courts in non-1991 Act
cases to treat McDonnell Douglas as nonmandatory assumes that Price
Waterhouse applies to non-1991 Act cases (as a result of the Bizarro
argument), but calls into question whether Justice O'Connor's concurrence remains the controlling opinion. To date, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence has been considered controlling because it
has been thought to be the narrowest grounds for the Court's decision.159 While the four Justice plurality and Justice White would have
permitted plaintiffs to use the Price Waterhouse framework irrespective
156 See id. (explaining why the assumption of uniformity now suggests that Congress' corrected interpretation in the 1991 Act, and not Price Waterhouse, should apply
in non-1991 Act cases).
157 See id. (manuscript at 18) (explaining "limited amendment" argument-or,
what Professor Prenkert calls the Bizarro argument). The courts seem split over
whether to accept the Bizarro argument. Compare id. (manuscript at 17 n.61) (citing
cases that apply Price Waterhouse to non-1991 Act claims), with id. (manuscript at 19
n.66) (citing cases that do not apply Price Waterhouse to non-1991 Act claims).
158 See id.
159 See supra note 32; see also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1997)
("When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds .... ' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))).
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of whether they had "direct evidence," 160 Justice O'Connor restricted
this framework to those who had "direct evidence." 16 1 As such, her
opinion was seen as the most restrictive of the concurring opinions,
and thus controlling.
However, based on our new understanding of McDonnell Douglas,
Justice O'Connor's concurrence appears to be less restrictive than that
of the plurality or Justice White-at least if we read her concurrence
literally. If we read Justice O'Connor's instructions literally, plaintiffs
without "direct evidence" would be required to use McDonnell Douglas,
which would effectively permit them to prevail by proving only "motivating factor" causation (as opposed to the Price Waterhouse framework, which would permit them to prevail only if there was "but for"
causation).162 This would make Justice O'Connor's concurrence
broader-not narrower-than the opinions of the plurality and Justice White and would render one of those two other opinions controlling. And neither of those opinions requires plaintiffs without "direct
63
evidence" to use McDonnell Douglas.1
Both the plurality and Justice White in Price Waterhouse would permit all plaintiffs to proceed by proving "motivating factor" causation,
thereby shifting the burden to the defendant to prove a lack of "but
for" causation (for liability and damages).164 Thus, if one of these
160 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261-79 (1989) (plurality opinion),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; id. at
259-60 (White, J., concurring).
See id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161
162 See supra Part I.C.3.
163 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 257 (plurality opinion); id. at 258-60 (White, J.,
concurring).
164 Id. at 249-50 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring). While Justice White's concurrence is a little cryptic on this matter, he states at the outset of his
concurrence that the correct approach is found in Mt. Healthy City School District Board
of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258-59
(White, J., concurring). The Mt. Healthy approach is essentially identical to that of
the plurality: if a plaintiff proves "motivating factor" causation, the burden shifts to
the defendant to prove a lack of "but for" causation (and, if the defendant succeeds in
this, there is no liability). Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287. The only point on which he
seems to disagree with the plurality is that he believed the plurality wanted defendants
to provide "objective" evidence of their reasons-which does not seem to have been
an issue in any post-Pice Waterhouse cases (or in Price Waterhouse). See Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 261. But see Garcia v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 2000)
(discussing, but not requiring, an objective evidence requirement and finding defendant produced sufficient objective evidence); Foster v. Univ. of Ark., 938 F.2d 111,
114 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting the objective evidence requirement set forth by the plurality in Price Waterhouse, but not deciding on that basis); Ford v. St. Elizabeth Hosp.,
No. 92-CV-511, 1993 WL 330036, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1993) (considering objective evidence but not specifically basing the court's decision on it).
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opinions were seen as controlling, there would be no "direct evidence" requirement-and, more importantly, nothing that compelled
courts to mandate McDonnell Douglas.
The problem with this second argument is that it seems a little
strained. It requires us to read Justice O'Connor's concurrence too
literally, and thus lacks persuasive force. Quite simply, it is difficult to
accept an argument that requires us to suppose thatJustice O'Connor
(inadvertently) lowered the causal standard for plaintiffs without
"direct evidence." However, a rejection of this literalist argument,
with its focus on whatJustice O'Connor said, sets the stage for a more
functionalist argument based on what Justice O'Connor probably
meant: the changed-circumstances argument.
c.

Changed Circumstances

The final argument for a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas in
non-1991 Act cases is based on changed circumstances. This argument can be made even if we concede that (1) Price Waterhouse applies
to non-1991 Act cases (as a result of the Bizarro argument), and (2)
Justice O'Connor's concurrence is the controlling opinion in that
case. The argument is that, because of changed circumstances, the
rule in that concurrence should be understood differently. Most
courts and commentators currently understand the rule in that concurrence as: plaintiffs without "direct evidence" must use McDonnell
Douglas.16 5 The "changed circumstances" argument suggests that the
rule in Justice O'Connor's concurrence should be understood as:
plaintiffs without "direct evidence" need to bear the full burden of
proving "but for" causation (but need not use McDonnell Douglas).
The whole point of Justice O'Connor's "direct evidence" distinction was to limit the burden-shifting benefit of Price Waterhouse to the
plaintiffs whom she saw as being most "deserving" (those with "direct
evidence"); plaintiffs she saw as less "deserving" (those without "direct
evidence") would be denied access to this burden-shifting device by
being forced to use McDonnell Douglas.' 66 But in light of the analysis
in Part I, we now know that forcing these less "deserving" plaintiffs to
use McDonnell Douglas does not disadvantage them; it actually gives
them an advantage. As we saw above, McDonnell Douglas proves only
165 See, e.g., Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assurance Co., 359 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2004).
166 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring). I have put
"deserving" in quotes to make clear that I do not necessarily subscribe to this view of
plaintiffs' merits. But for purposes of this argument, I will acceptJustice O'Connor's
view on the matter.
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"motivating factor" causation. 167 So, if we force plaintiffs without
"direct evidence" to use McDonnell Douglas, we would effectively let
them win by proving only "motivating factor" causation; 16 while those
without "direct evidence," who are allowed to use the Price Waterhouse
framework, will lose if there is anything less than "but for"
69
causation.
In other words, in light of our new understanding of McDonnell
Douglas, perhaps the lower courts should read Justice O'Connor's
Price Waterhouse concurrence less literally and more functionally. That
is, perhaps the lower courts should do whatJustice O'Connor wanted
to do, rather than what she said. It is almost certain that she wanted
to impose a more stringent standard on plaintiffs without "direct evidence" (whom she saw as less "deserving"). The only more stringent
standard than the Price Waterhouse framework (which requires "but
for" causation for liability, but permits plaintiffs to shift the burden for
proving this) 17 0 would be a "but for" standard for liability with no
opportunity for burden-shifting; that is, a standard under which the
plaintiff must bear the full burden of proving "but for" causation. Justice O'Connor most likely thought that making certain plaintiffs use
McDonnell Douglas would accomplish this. We now know that she was
wrong. Thus, lower courts could do what Justice O'Connor wanted
(make plaintiffs without "direct evidence" prove "but for" causation),
without requiring the use of McDonnell Douglas.
Note that this "changed circumstances" argument would not
eradicate the "direct evidence" requirement. It would simply suggest
a different role for that requirement-a role that does not mandate
the use of McDonnellDouglas. Courts would force those plaintiffs without "direct evidence" to bear the full burden of proving "but for" causation, while those with "direct evidence" could shift the burden to
defendants on this issue by proving "motivating factor" causation.

167 See supra Part I.C.3.
168 Remember, even if she wanted to, Justice O'Connor could not have required
plaintiffs without "direct evidence" to use the strong version of McDonnell Douglasthat is, to prove "sole factor" causation. See supra Part I.C.4. Moreover, it is fairly clear
that Justice O'Connor did not intend to require "sole factor" causation. See Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265-66 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (focusing on "substantial
factor" rather than "sole factor" causation).
169 Recall that, under Price Waterhouse, if there is less than "but for" causation (that
is, if the defendant proves that it would have made the "same decision" absent the
protected characteristic), the plaintiff loses. See supra note 119.
170 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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However, all plaintiffs would have a choice as to whether to use
17 1
McDonnell Douglas.
Because it would leave the "direct evidence" concept in place, this
argument would not solve the confusion that has arisen from trying to
define that phrase. 172 Moreover, and perhaps even more problematic, this argument would require a class of plaintiffs (non-1991 Act
plaintiffs without "direct evidence") to bear the full burden of proving
"but for" causation. As I will demonstrate below, such a requirement
is both doctrinally and normatively problematic. 173 But the argument
would, at least, permit lower courts to treat McDonnell Douglas as
nonmandatory.
C. Drainingthe Swamp
The vision set out above-of plaintiffs being able to choose
McDonnell Douglas or other methods of proof as they see fit to prove
the causal standards set out in the alternative frameworks-does more
than permit implementation of a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas. It
also resolves three major debates that have plagued disparate treatment doctrine, greatly increasing the uncertainty and cost of litigation
17 4
in this area.

171 This would raise the question of whether there is any other way of proving "but
for" causation besides the strong version of McDonnell Douglas, short of an employer's
admission that it used a protected characteristic as a "but for" factor in the challenged
decision. The answer is that there is probably not another way to prove "but for"
causation. See infra Part II.C.1. But even if this were true, the plaintiff in such a case
would be required to use the strong version of McDonnell Douglas not because any
mandate by the Court, but rather because the law required the plaintiff to prove "but
for" causation and the strong version of McDonnell Douglas happened to be the only
way to prove this standard.
172 See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
173 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the doctrinal argument) and note 182 (discussing the normative arguments).
174 The text below discusses three debates that are resolved once we understand
the proper role for McDonnell Douglas as a nonmandatory method of proof. In addition, the understanding of how McDonnell Douglas works that underlies its nonmandatory nature resolves three additional debates that have long plagued disparate
treatment law. See supra notes 80 (resolving the "pretext-plus" debate and laying to
rest a long-running academic debate over the correctness of the Court's decision in
Hicks) and 67 (resolving the debate over the availability of a "good faith" defense
under McDonnell Douglas).
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Ending the "Direct Evidence" Debate (The Death of "Direct
Evidence")

The first doctrinal morass that has enveloped disparate treatment
law is over the meaning of "direct evidence." As discussed above, the
concept of "direct evidence" has long been used as a gateway to those
who wish to escape McDonnell Douglas.175 Those with "direct evidence" have been allowed to use alternative frameworks; those who do
not have been forced to use McDonnell Douglas.1 76 And while Desert
Palace eradicated this requirement in 1991 Act cases, the "direct evidence" requirement has so far appeared to be alive and well in cases
outside of the 1991 Act.17 7 The doctrinal morass arises because it is
far from clear what "direct evidence" means. The courts of appeals
178
have split four ways on this issue.
We can now see that the way out of this morass is to jettison the
"direct evidence" doctrine. Once McDonnell Douglas is no longer
mandatory, there is no need for the "direct evidence" doctrine. After
all, the primary function for the doctrine has been to decide which
plaintiffs must use McDonnell Douglas.' 79 With no need to perform
this function, the "direct evidence" doctrine would seem superfluous.
And, as we saw above, courts are under no obligation to continue to
apply this doctrine. 180 So they should stop. Then there would no
longer be any need to define "direct evidence."
Arguably, even in a world of nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas,
there remains one potential use for the "direct evidence" doctrine: it
might be used to determine which plaintiffs will be forced to bear the
full burden of proving "but for" causation (as opposed to being
allowed to shift the burden upon a showing of "motivating factor" causation, as permitted by Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act). As discussed above, it is possible-even likely-that this is what the "direct
181
evidence" requirement was originally designed to do.
However, this possibility-and thus the potential viability of the
"direct evidence" distinction-supposes that disparate treatment law
requires at least some plaintiffs (for example, those without "direct
175 See supra Part I.A.
176 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 44.
178 See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing circuit split), affid, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
179 See supra Part I.A.
180 See supra Part II.B.1 (noting that Desert Palace eradicated "direct evidence"
requirement in 1991 Act cases), II.B.2.b-c (arguing that courts are under no obligation to apply the "direct evidence" doctrine in non-1991 Act cases).
181 See supra Part II.B.2.a.
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evidence") to bear the full burden of proving "but for" causation.
While a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas does not preclude this possibility, the analysis underlying a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas
does. This analysis demonstrates why, as a doctrinal matter, plaintiffs
can never be required to bear the full burden of proving "but for"
causation-and thus, why the "direct evidence" doctrine could never
serve this purpose.

182

The problem with requiring plaintiffs to prove "but for" is that
such a requirement would be tantamount to a "sole cause" requirement, which, as noted above, has been forbidden by Congress. 183 This
is because, as a practical matter, there is no way to prove "but for"
causation without also proving "sole" causation. 184 The only practical
way to prove "but for" causation is to use the strong version of McDonnell Douglas. And, as we saw above, the strong version of McDonnell
5
Douglas proves "sole" causation.18
Other methods of proving causation are simply incapable of proving "but for" causation. Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff has statistical proof suggesting that a defendant's decisions correlate with
race. This would suggest that race played a role in those decisions,
but would not necessarily suggest that race played a "but for" role. Or
suppose that the plaintiff has evidence that the defendant has made
racist statements in the context of the challenged decision-or even
an admission that he considered the plaintiffs race in making the
challenged decision. Such proof is generally considered to be one of
the most powerful forms of evidence, meeting almost every possible
182 In addition to the doctrinal argument in the text, there are also four normative
arguments about why a plaintiff should never be required to prove "but for" causation: First, as suggested in the text immediately below, proving "but for" causation is
extremely difficult. See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. Second, it is much
more difficult for the plaintiff to prove "but for" causation (which requires proof of a
negative-that is, proof of the lack of any independently sufficient factor in the decision) than it is for the defendant to prove a lack of "but for" causation (which
requires only proof of a positive-that is, a single independently sufficient factor in
the decision). Third, most of the relevant evidence on the issue of causation is within
the defendant's control. In fact, most of it is in the defendant's head. See Katz, supra
note 30, at 515-17. And finally, once the plaintiff proves "motivating factor" causation, the defendant has been established as a wrongdoer and the party responsible for
the need to sort out "but for" causation. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 3, at 48. These
facts provide a strong normative argument against placing the burden on plaintiffs to
prove "but for"-and an argument for burden-shifting mechanisms, such as those in
the 1991 Act or Price Waterhouse.

183
184
185

See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.4.
See supra Part I.C.4.
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definition of "direct evidence." 8 6 And such evidence would certainly
suggest that race played a role in that decision. But it would not nec18 7
essarily suggest that race played a "but for" role in that decision.
None of these methods of proof can show "but for" causation
because, by definition, proving that a protected factor (such as race or
sex) was a "but for" cause of a challenged decision requires that there
was no second, independently sufficient factor in that decision.,,
And none of the methods of proof above foreclose the possibility of a
second, independently sufficient factor in the defendant's decision.
The only way to foreclose this possibility is to prove that all reasons
proffered by the defendant were pretextual-that is, to use the strong
version of McDonnell Douglas.18 9 As we have seen above, such a
requirement would amount to a "sole cause" requirement, running
afoul of Congress' rejection of that standard.' 9 0 Thus, the law cannot
require plaintiffs to prove "but for" causation.19 1
186 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1071; see also Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2002), affjd, 539
U.S. 90 (2003) (explaining various definitions of "direct evidence").
187 Theoretically, the defendant might admit that he not only used a protected
factor (such as race or sex) in the challenged decision, but also that he would not
have reached the same decision absent this factor. This type of admission would, of
course, prove "but for" causation. However, such admissions are sufficiently unlikely
that it would seem quite safe to discount this possibility.
188 Recall that what prevents a protected factor (such as race or sex) from being a
"but for" cause is the existence of a second nonprotected factor (such as excessive
tardiness) that would be sufficient to bring about the challenged employment decision. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
189 Note that there is no similar problem with asking defendants to prove a lack of
"but for" causation. Such a requirement simply obliges a defendant to advance at
least one independently sufficient factor.
190 See supra Part I.C.4.
191 One might resist this conclusion by arguing that the Supreme Court has
required certain plaintiffs to bear the full burden of proving "but for" causation.
However, the only opinion in which the Supreme Court has done so unequivocally is
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262-63 (concluding that plaintiffs without "direct evidence" must bear full burden of proving "but for" causation). As noted above, this
opinion has been overruled, at least in the 1991 Act context. See supraPart I.A; see also
Desert Palace,Inc., 539 U.S. at 101-02 (holding, in 1991 Act case, that "direct evidence
of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases"). And, as discussed above,
Price Waterhouse has no place in non-1991 Act cases. See supra Part II.B.2.a; see also
Katz, supra note 154 (manuscript at 14-20) (arguing that Price Waterhouse, having
been legislatively overruled in 1991 Act cases, should not be understood to apply to
non-1991 Act cases). Some writers believe the Court imposed such a burden in Hazen
Paper,where it said that a plaintiff can only succeed where the protected factor (age)
"had a determinative influence on the outcome" (firing). Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). "Determinative influence" almost certainly means "but for."
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In summary, there is no need for the "direct evidence" doctrine.
Once McDonnell Douglas is not mandatory, the "direct evidence" doctrine cannot serve to determine which plaintiffs must use McDonnell
Douglas. And because current doctrine cannot require any plaintiff to
prove "but for" causation, the "direct evidence" doctrine cannot serve
to allocate that burden. Being superfluous, there is no need to define
19 2
"direct evidence." Problem solved.

See Katz, supra note 30, at 501-03. But Hazen Paperdid not address burdens of proof.
The plaintiff there was not asking for a burden-shift, and the sentence in question says
nothing about who has the burden of proving "determinative influence." See Hazen
Paper,507 U.S. at 610 (noting the necessity of proving "determinative influence," but
failing to address who bears the burden of proof). In any event, to the extent that a
Supreme Court opinion on this issue could be seen as requiring plaintiffs to bear the
full burden of proving "but for," it would conflict with Congress' instruction that "sole
factor" can never be required-and would have to yield. See supra notes 109-10 and
accompanying text.
192 There are two additional arguments against the "direct evidence" doctrine.
First, Congress has not used this term in any disparate treatment statute. In Desert
Palace,the Court held that the fact that this term appears nowhere in the 1991 Act or
its legislative history suggests that Congress simply did not intend to require plaintiffs
suing under that Act to provide "direct evidence." Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 91. But
the same can be said for virtually every other disparate treatment statute. None refer
to "direct evidence." Thus, it would seem, Congress did not intend to require plaintiffs under those statutes to provide "direct evidence." Some courts have already
adopted this view. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
A second argument against the "direct evidence" doctrine is that there is no good
definition for this term. We have seen that McDonnell Douglas provides one way to
prove causation-one type of evidence. See Part I.C. Under virtually any definition,
this method is not "direct"; it clearly relies on circumstantial evidence. Thus, we can
envision two possible definitions of "direct evidence." First, "direct evidence" could
be defined as any type of evidence other than McDonnell Douglas. But given the purpose of "direct evidence" (determining which plaintiffs must use McDonnell Douglas),
this definition would be circular. It would require plaintiffs who use McDonnell Douglas (those without "direct evidence") to use McDonnell Douglas. The second option
would be to define "direct evidence" as some subset of non-McDonnell Douglas evidence. That is, we could divide non-McDonnell Douglas evidence into two categories:
"direct" and "indirect." The problem with this definition is that it would effectively
foreclose the use of one of those subcategories of evidence. Plaintiffs with "direct
evidence" would be allowed to use that type of evidence. But plaintiffs with "indirect
evidence" would be required to use McDonnell Douglas-andbe precluded from using
the subcategory of non-McDonnellDouglas evidence defined as "indirect." Thus, there
would seem to be no good definition for "direct evidence." See GEORGE RUTHERGLEN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 49-50 (1st ed. 2001) (noting that the "direct evidence" distinction "transforms a question of degree-how closely evidence is connected to a fact in dispute-into a question of kind-whether it is connected closely
enough to be 'direct"').
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The Applicability of Desert Palace Outside the 1991 Act

A second doctrinal morass involves the proper scope of Desert Palace. In that case, the Supreme Court eradicated the "direct evidence"
requirement-at least in 1991 Act cases. 193 The question is whether
Desert Palaceapplies in non-1991 Act cases, and thus whether courts in
such cases should continue to require plaintiffs without "direct evidence" to use McDonnell Douglas. The courts of appeals have split on
19 4
this question.
The analysis above resolves this debate: there is no place for the
"direct evidence" doctrine-even in non-1991 Act cases. This is not
because of Desert Palace. Rather, it is because-properly understoodMcDonnell Douglas should not be required in any case. 1 9 5 Thus,
whether Desert Palace applies outside of the 1991 Act is irrelevant.
Debate over.
3.

The Proper Role of McDonnell Douglas in a Post-Desert Palace
World ("I'm Not Dead Yet" a9 6 )

Desert Palace--the Court's attempt to simplify things-has given
rise to a third doctrinal morass. In the wake of that decision's eradication of the "direct evidence" requirement in 1991 Act cases, courts
and commentators have engaged in a four-way debate over the proper
role, if any, for McDonnell Douglas in 1991 Act cases. One camp (the
"dead" camp) claims that McDonnell Douglas is "dead"-that it should
never be used after Desert Palace.1 97 A second camp (the "choice"
camp) takes the position that, after DesertPalace,plaintiffs should have
the choice of using either McDonnell Douglas or the 1991 Act framework.' 9 8 A third camp (the "modified" camp) says that all plaintiffs
193 Desert Palace,539 U.S. at 101-02.
194 See supra notes 177-78.
195 See supraParts I.C.3-5; see also supra Part II.C.1 (arguing that lower courts need
not apply the "direct evidence" doctrine, either in 1991 Act or non-1991 Act cases).
196 Aficionados of Monty Python will realize that I must give credit here to the
movie, MONTv PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Michael White Productions 1975), as
well as its more recent incarnation in the Broadway show, Spamalot.
197 See supra note 21 (listing those who believe McDonnell Douglas is "dead"); see
also Davis, supra note 6, at 862 (arguing that Desert Palacereduced McDonnell Douglas
to "an empty formality" which should be abandoned).
198 Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 & n.4 (4th
Cir. 2005); Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2004);
McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004); Hill v. Lockheed
Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004); Estades-Negroni v.
Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 345 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2003), vacated, 362 F.3d 874 (1st Cir.
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must use a "modified" version of McDonnell Douglas.1 99 And a fourth
camp (the "mixed motive" camp) takes the position that only plaintiffs who plead a "mixed motive" case (whatever that might be) should
have such a choice.2 0 0 The analysis above demonstrates that all four
of these camps are wrong.
All four of these camps posit a false dichotomy. Each is premised
on the idea that a choice must be made-either by the court or by one
or more of the parties-between McDonnell Douglas and the 1991
Act. 20 1 The "dead" camp's argument is based on the idea that after
the demise of the "direct evidence" doctrine, plaintiffs are free to
choose between McDonnell Douglas and the 1991 Act. 20 2 (This camp's
adherents apparently believe that no plaintiff in her right mind would
choose McDonnell Douglas2 03-an argument I will address in Part
III.E.) The "choice" and the "modified" camps both posit a similar
choice by plaintiffs. The "choice" camp simply permits plaintiffs to
choose between McDonnell Douglas and the 1991 Act.2 0 4 And the
"modified" camp requires all parties to use the first two stages of
McDonnell Douglas (prima facie case and nondiscriminatory reason),
but at the third stage permits plaintiffs to choose between the "pretext
method" (the third stage of the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework) and the framework set out in the 1991 Act.20 5 Finally, the
"mixed motive" camp posits that the choice between these frameworks
should be made by the court based on whether the plaintiff pleads a
2004); Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, No. CIV-03-1477-C, 2006 WL 1716557, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. June 21, 2006).
199 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
200 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
201 See Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1196 (N.D.
Iowa 2003) (remarking that Desert Palaceends the "false dichotomy" between McDonnell Douglas and the 1991 Act/Price Waterhouse). See generally T.L. Nagy, The Fall of the
False Dichotomy: The Effect of Desert Palace v. Costa on Summary Judgment in Title VII

Discrimination Cases, 46 S. TEX. L. REv. 137, 154-61 (2004) (arguing in favor of the
Dunbarapproach). Ironically, Dunbarwas the case that began the use of a modified
version of McDonnell Douglas. See Dunbar, 285 F. Supp. 2d at 1197. As noted below,
this modified version continues to posit a false dichotomy.
202 See, e.g, Corbett, supra note 58, at 1576.
203 See id.; Van Detta, LeRoiEst Mort, supra note 15, at 72. Professor Zimmer takes
a more nuanced view, arguing that McDonnell Douglas will only likely be used where
the parties agree to use it and in those rare situations where a defendant fails to
proffer a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Zimmer, supranote 11, at 1932.
However, like the other scholars, Zimmer assumes that someone must make a choice
between McDonnell Douglasand the 1991 Act (either both of the parties by agreement,
or the court). Id. at 1939.
204 See, e.g., Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735-36.
205 See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
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"mixed motive" case. 20 6 Thus, all four camps believe that a choice
must be made between McDonnell Douglas and the 1991 Act.
The problem with all four camps is that there is no need to
choose between McDonnell Douglas and the 1991 Act. As discussed
above, these two frameworks do not compete with each other; they
complement each other. 20 7 The 1991 Act sets standards of causation
and McDonnellDouglas provides a method for proving those standards.
There is no need to choose between these things. The only things a
plaintiff needs to choose in a 1991 Act case are (1) how to prove
"motivating factor" causation, and possibly (2) how to resist the "same
action" defense. 208 The plaintiff can choose to try to accomplish these
things using McDonnell Douglas-or not. But there is no need to
choose between McDonnell Douglas and the 1991 Act, as all four camps
suggest.
The last two camps-the third ("modified" McDonnell Douglas)
camp and fourth ("mixed motive") camp-are doubly flawed. Not
only do they posit a false dichotomy between McDonnell Douglas and
the 1991 Act, but they also mandate McDonnell Douglas. The fourth
camp requires those plaintiffs who do not plead a "mixed motive" case
to use McDonnell Douglas.20 9 And the third camp requires all plaintiffs
to use a "modified" version of McDonnell Douglas.2 10 As we saw
above, 21 1 it makes no sense to require any plaintiff to use McDonnell
2 12
Douglas, "modified" or otherwise.
The first camp (the "dead" camp) is also simply wrong in its
assessment of the role played by McDonnell Douglas. As we saw above,
2 13 It
McDonnellDouglasis not dead in post-Desert Palace 1991 Act cases.
206

See, e.g., Richardson v. Monitronics Int'l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 332-33 (5th Cir.

2005).
207 See supra Part II.A.
208 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
209 See, e.g., Bloomer v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 94 F. App'x 820, 826 (10th Cir.
2004).
210 See, e.g., Rachid, 376 F.3d at 312.
211 See supra Part 1.
212 As noted above, proponents of a "modified" McDonnell Douglas might argue
that the modification to the framework at least ameliorates the problem of a
mandatory McDonnell Douglas. The modification, after all, seems to give plaintiffs a
choice as to whether to use the third-most difficult-stage of McDonnell Douglas. See
supra note 137. However, as also discussed above, the modified version remains problematic, as it requires all litigants to use the first two stages of McDonnell Douglas and
also exacts a high price for plaintiffs to opt out of the third stage (they must concede
that the defendant had a legitimate reason). See supra note 137.
213 Dean Kaminshine argues, as I do, that McDonnell Douglas is not "dead." See
Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 7. However, his argument is based on the claim that
McDonnell Douglas and the 1991 Act are mutually exclusive; that McDonnell Douglas
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retains a vital role in those cases: it provides an important method of
2 14
proving the causal standards set out in the 1991 Act.

There is one sense in which the "dead" camp has it right. One
might see this camp as arguing not that McDonnellDouglas is dead, but
rather arguing that a mandatory McDonnell Douglas is dead. As discussed above, a mandatory McDonnell Douglas is and should be
dead. 21 5 However, even in this regard, the "dead" camp is problematic. A mandatory McDonnellDouglas is not dead because of Desert Palace or its eradication of the "direct evidence" requirement, as the
"dead" camp posits. Rather, the death of a mandatory McDonnell
Douglas results from the fact that it makes no sense to require McDonnell Douglas.
This distinction is critical. If it made sense to require some plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas, then eradicating the "direct evidence"
requirement (as Desert Palace did) would not necessarily eradicate a
mandatory McDonnell Douglas. Courts might find other ways to
require some plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas. The courts in the
third and fourth camps (those that require plaintiffs who do not plead
"mixed motive" cases to use McDonnell Douglas and those that require
all plaintiffs to use a "modified" McDonnell Douglas) are good examples of this. After the demise of the "direct evidence" doctrine, these
courts have found alternative ways to require plaintiffs to use McDonnell Douglas.2 16 Thus, even as to this limited point-the death of a
mandatory McDonnell Douglas-the "dead" camp's arguments are
2 17
problematic.
proves (and thus, he believes, requires) "but for" causation, while the 1991 Act
requires "motivating factor" causation. See id. at 41. However, as we have seen above,
McDonnell Douglas-orat least the basic version of it, which is all that can be possibly
be required-does not prove "but for" causation. See supra Part I.C.3.
214 See supra Part II.A; see also infta Part III.E. (explaining why many plaintiffs
should-and do, and will-choose McDonnell Douglas).
215 See supra Part I.C.5.
216

See supra Part I.A.

217 There is an additional flaw with the argument that McDonnellDouglas is "dead."
This argument is based largely on the premise that McDonnell Douglas requires "but
for" causation. As noted above, the "dead" camp believes that, given the choice, no
plaintiff in her right mind would choose McDonnell Douglas over the 1991 Act framework. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. This argument is generally premised on the idea that the 1991 Act requires plaintiffs to prove only "motivating
factor" causation, while McDonnell Douglas requires "but for" causation. See Corbett,
supra note 58, at 1576; Van Detta, Le RoiEst Mort, supra note 15, at 117-19. However,
as we have seen above, McDonnell Douglas does not represent a "but for" requirement.
See supra Part I.C.3.
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In summary, in 1991 Act cases, McDonnell Douglas serves as one
potential, nonmandatory method for proving the standards set out in
that Act. While Desert Palace simplifies the implementation of this
role, this role is not a product of Desert Palace. Rather, the proper role
for McDonnellDouglas is a product of causal logic and the way in which
McDonnellDouglas proves causation. That logic not only demonstrates
the proper role for McDonnellDouglas, it also resolves the other doctrinal quagmires that have plagued disparate treatment law.
III.

ADDRESSING THE CRrIcIsMs OF MCDONNELL DouGLAS

We have now seen that McDonnell Douglas should not be
mandatory. It is merely one method, among others, by which plaintiffs can prove causation. This fact alone removes virtually all of the
teeth from the various normative criticisms that have been leveled at
McDonnell Douglas. For even if McDonnell Douglas were indeed deeply
flawed, these flaws would become far less serious if no one were
required to use the flawed framework. Plaintiffs who believe that the
framework is flawed could simply opt out of it and choose to prove
causation in whatever other way they preferred.
This Part, however, shows that McDonnell Douglas is not flawed.
Not only do plaintiffs have the option of using this framework, they
should often choose to do so. The first four subparts, address-and
rebut-the major normative criticisms which have been leveled
against McDonnell Douglas. The final subpart shows why McDonnell
Douglas will often be the only effective way in which plaintiffs can
prove causation-why it is, in fact, a gift to antidiscrimination law.
A.

The Formalism Critique

Some writers have accused McDonnell Douglas of being distracting2 18 or overly formalistic. 2 19 The fear, apparently, is thatjudges and
juries will get so caught up in the mechanics of burden-shifting and
pretext that they might lose sight of the bigger issue: whether there
22
has been discrimination.

0

218 See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 15, at 183.
219 See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 6, at 2237-38.
220 See, e.g.,
McCormick, supra note 15, at 161 (noting that "courts ... get so
caught up in principles promoted by the test that they lose sight of the law," which has
made it "nearly impossible to combat discrimination"); see also Wells v. Colo. Dep't of
Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring) ("The McDonnell
Douglas framework only creates confusion and distracts courts from 'the ultimate

question of discrimination vel non.' McDonnell Douglas has served its purpose and
should be abandoned." (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
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The solution, however, is not to jettison McDonnell Douglas. The
better solution is to contextualize McDonnell Douglas. We should make
sure to focus-and ask judges and juries to focus-on the relationship
between McDonnell Douglas and discrimination: the point of McDonnell
Douglas is to prove discriminatory causation by proving pretext.
Awareness of the exact inferences that make up the pretext chain
22 1
should also help in this regard.
A related criticism is that the formalism of McDonnellDouglas permits judges to "slice and dice" evidence. The criticism is that judges
often divide evidence into categories and then decide that the evidence in each category is insufficient, instead of looking at the evi2 22
dence as a whole.
However, "slicing and dicing" is endemic to litigation generally,
especially in motions practice. 22 3 It is not limited to McDonnell Douglas. Nor would eliminating McDonnell Douglas be likely to eliminate
this practice.
Moreover, there is nothing wrong with such "slicing and dicing."
Looking at each piece of evidence in relation to the specific issue that
the piece of evidence is purported to show makes perfect sense. The
only pitfall is where the judge fails to consider evidence relevant to a
particular point or fails to look at the cumulative weight of the evidence on a particular point. A complete understanding of how
McDonnell Douglas proves causation, such as that offered in this Article, should help to ensure that all evidence is properly applied and
224
weighed.
Thus, the critics' claim that McDonnell Douglas is distracting is
weak. This is a problem that is easily remedied by analyses such as the
one in this Article. And the critics' claim that McDonnell Douglas
causes or increases improper "slicing and dicing" is misplaced. There
U.S. 711, 714 (1983))); Malamud, supra note 6, at 2279 (arguing that the McDonnell
Douglas "proof structure actually does little to aid [courts'] analysis of the facts").
221 See supranote 74 (discussing propriety of instructing juries on pretext and burden-shifting aspects of McDonnell Douglas).
222 See generally Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of IndividualDisparate Treatment

Law, 61 LA. L. REv. 577, 584-85, 595-97 (2001) (explaining how courts "slice[ ] and
dice[ ] . . . the evidence in the record in order to draw inferences in favor of the
employer").
223 See, e.g., id. at 592-600.
224 Pretext evidence of causation should be viewed cumulatively with nonpretext
evidence. And nonpretext evidence may be relevant to pretext. For example, racist
statements by a decisionmaker might make it more likely that a proffered reason that
was incorrect was also a lie, a cover-up, and a cover-up for discrimination. See Kaminshine, supra note 14, at 56 (noting that nonpretext evidence might be relevant to
pretext and vice versa).
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is nothing about the framework that causes the problem of improper
"slicing and dicing." But a complete understanding of McDonnell
Douglas, such as the one contained in this Article, should help to
ensure that pretext evidence is weighed properly. These criticisms do
not suggest any reason to stop using McDonnell Douglas.
B.

The Multiple Reasons Critique and the "Personal
Animosity Presumption"

Other critics argue that McDonnell Douglas stacks the deck against
plaintiffs by requiring them to disprove every reason offered by the
defendant for its action. 225 If plaintiffs were indeed required to rebut
every reason offered by the defendant, defendants might be inclined
to offer many reasons for their actions, as well as to try to find reasons
that were hard to rebut. This could make plaintiffs' task unduly
difficult.
The problem has been exacerbated, critics claim, by some courts'
inclination on summary judgment motions to provide additional reasons for a defendant's action-reasons that were not proffered by the
defendant-and then requiring the plaintiff to rebut the court's, as
well as the defendant's, reasons. 226 One form of this tendency has
225 See Brodin, supra note 64, at 183, 215; Derum & Engle, supra note 8, at
1224-25; Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 335 ("Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the general
rule that has developed [where employers offer] multiple justifications is that, to
defeat employers' motions for summary judgment, plaintiffs must typically present
evidence that each of these reasons is not the true reason for the action, and that
discrimination was the real reason for the adverse action."); see also Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The plaintiff must put forward
evidence rebutting each of the nondiscriminatory reasons the employer articulates.");
Clay v. Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[The plaintiff] must
present facts to rebut each and every legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason advanced
by the [defendant] in order to survive summary judgment."); Herawi v. Ala. Dep't of
Forensic Scis., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1346 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (requiring the plaintiff to
disprove all of the reasons proffered by the defendant). But see Bryant v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that "'when the plaintiff casts
substantial doubt on many of the employer's multiple reasons, the jury could reasonably find the employer lacks credibility"' (quoting Tyler v. RE/MAX Mountain States,
Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 2000))); Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398
F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the defendant's argument that the plaintiff
must rebut every reason offered by the defendant).
226 See, e.g., Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 90 F.3d 285, 290-91 (8th Cir. 1996)
(affirming the lower court's holding that the plaintiff did not adequately demonstrate
that racial discrimination rather than personal animosity motivated his termination);
Brodin, supra note 64, at 215 ("What makes no sense is requiring the plaintiff to
disprove theories not put into play by defendant."); Derum & Engle, supra note 8, at
1224-25 (noting that even when the plaintiffs rebut all of the defendant's nondis-
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been referred to as a "personality presumption," in which many courts
attribute employers' actions to a supervisor's hostility toward the
plaintiff, rather than attributing such actions to racism or sexism (and
assuming any hostility is unrelated to racism or sexism).227
However, while any of these trends would certainly be problematic, they are not required-or even permitted-under McDonnell
Douglas. As we have seen, McDonnell Douglas is not based on a process
of elimination. It does not require the plaintiff to rebut all reasons
proffered by the defendant. Rebutting just one reason will allow a
factfinder to conclude that the reason was a lie, a cover-up, and a
228
cover-up for discrimination.
It is true that a plaintiff who seeks to use the strong version of
McDonnell Douglas as a way to prove "but for" causation must in fact
eliminate every reason proffered by the defendant. 229 But this is necessary only to prove "but for" causation-not to prove causation generally. Under Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act, there is no need for
plaintiffs to prove "but for" causation; their burden is only to prove
"motivating factor" causation. 230 So the only plaintiffs who will need
to worry about eliminating all of the defendant's proffered reasons
are those who volunteer to take on this burden of proof in order to
231
preempt a "same decision"/"same action" defense.
Employers may be inclined to proffer multiple reasons for the
challenged action in a bid to prevent a finding of "but for" causation.
This is because each proffered reason might support a "same decision"/"same action" defense. However, properly understood, McDonnell Douglas renders this strategy a risky one. Because plaintiffs can
criminatory reasons, courts may nevertheless presume that personal animosity motivated the defendant's actions rather than discrimination); see also McCormick, supra
note 15, at 183 (discussing the problem of courts assuming nondiscriminatory reasons
for the challenged action which are not in the record).
227 See Derum & Engle, supra note 8, at 1224-28 (explaining the "personal animosity" presumption and presenting cases where courts have applied this presumption); cf Brodin, supra note 64, at 215-29 (discussing how the "personality" excuse is
the "ultimate pretext" which could potentially "eviscerate[ ] Title VII's protections").
228 See supra Part I.C.1.
229 See supra Part I.C.4.
230 As noted above, it is possible that there is a third alternative framework (in
addition to Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act), under which the plaintiff must bear
the full burden of proving "but for" causation (rather than shifting that burden to the
defendant upon a showing of "motivating factor," as in Price Waterhouse and the 1991
Act). See supra Part II.B.2, especially text accompanying notes 166 to 171. But as also
noted above, such a plaintiff-must-prove-"but for" framework should not be seen as
existing in current doctrine (and would be normatively flawed). See supra Part II.C.1,
especially text accompanying notes 183 to 192.
231 See supra Part II.A.
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prove "motivating factor" causation under McDonnell Douglas by disproving any single proffered reason, 232 a defendant who proffers multiple reasons increases the danger of losing on that issue. Moreover, if
an employer offers too many reasons-particularly ones that seem
hard to believe-it might increase the likelihood that a factfinder
would conclude that they are all pretextual. Thus, employers also
have a disincentive to provide multiple reasons for their action.
Employers may also still try to avoid findings of pretext by proffering reasons which are difficult to disprove-such as "personality conflicts." However, this practice may be prohibited by a specificity rule
that arguably arises from McDonnell Douglas. The point of McDonnell
Douglas is to require employers to provide a reason that can be
tested. 23 3 Accordingly, the Court has stated that the "defendant's
explanation of its legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific." 234 And, as noted by Professor Hart, courts are-and often
should be-increasingly suspicious when defendants proffer excessively subjective reasons for challenged actions. 235
The related concern about courts proffering nondiscriminatory
reasons which were not offered by the defendant is also addressed by
my analysis of McDonnell Douglas. That analysis shows that there are in
fact three nondiscriminatory reasons that a factfinder can find even
though they were not offered by the defendant: reasons that are part
of the pretext chain of inferences. 23 6 If the defendant's proffered reason is wrong, the factfinder can conclude either that the defendant
lied or that the defendant made a good faith mistake (a nondiscriminatory reason). Or if the defendant lied, the factfinder can conclude
that the lie was either a cover-up or a lie for a benign reason (a second
possible nondiscriminatory reason). Or, if the defendant engaged in
a cover-up, the factfinder can conclude that what was being covered
up was either a discriminatory motivation or a nondiscriminatory one
(a third possible nondiscriminatory reason). These three exculpatory
reasons, while not put into the record by the defendant, are not fore232 See supra Part I.C.2-3.
233 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973) (holding that
an employee "must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the presumptively valid reasons from his rejection were in fact a

coverup").
234 Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981); see, e.g., Aka v.
Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that "courts traditionally treat explanations that rely heavily on subjective considerations with caution");
Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 370-72 (noting that a few courts have expressed suspicion when a defendant presents subjective reasons).
235 See Hart, supra note 8, at 767.
236 See supra Part I.C.1.
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closed to the factfinder because they are part of the inferential chain
the plaintiff has asked the factfinder to use. Thus, a factfinder can
(but need not) find that one of these three reasons was the defendant's motivation, even if that reason was not suggested by the defendant. But this does not give license to the factfinder-or the courtto find other reasons that were not in the record. Reasons which were
not effectively put into play by the plaintiff (by invoking the pretext
method) or proffered by the defendant should be considered outside
23 7
of the record and off limits.
Moreover, a judge's speculative reason as to the motivation for
the defendant's action is simply irrelevant under the McDonnell Douglas framework. This framework works because, by proving the defendant's proffered reason wrong, the plaintiff sets in motion a chain of
inferences from which a factfinder can find discrimination.2 38 Where
a judge proffers a reason for the defendant's action, the judge's proffered reason does not serve this purpose. If the plaintiff disproves the
judge's reason, it does not give rise to an inference that the defendant
was lying. It only gives rise to an inference that the judge was wrongwhich does nothing to further the purpose of McDonnell Douglas.
Thus, the criticism that McDonnell Douglas requires plaintiffs to
rebut multiple reasons is simply wrong. Properly understood, the
framework requires the plaintiff to rebut only one reason. Moreover,
a proper understanding of the framework provides a new argument
against the practice of judges proffering reasons for the defendant's
action. McDonnell Douglas cannot be blamed for this ill.
C.

McDonnell Douglas and Assumptions Regarding the Prevalence
of Discrimination

A number of critics have argued that McDonnell Douglas depends
for its operation on an assumption that discrimination is prevalent,
and that judges seem less and less willing to make this assumptionparticularly on summary judgment motions. 23 9 The argument is
237

See supra note 228.

238 See supra Part I.C.1.
239 See Derum & Engle, supra note 8, at 1187-88, 1241; Krieger, supra note 15, at
1161-64; David N. Rosen & Jonathan M. Freiman, Remodeling McDonnell Douglas:
Fisher v. Vassar College and the Structure of Employment DiscriminationLaw, 17 QUINNIPIAC

L. REv. 725, 747-48 (1998); Selmi, supra note 80, at 325-26; Selmi, supra note

7, at 563; John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in Employment Discrimination Law:
Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights Law, 53 MERCER L. REv. 709, 717
n.37 (2002); see also Michael E. Gold, Towards a Unified Theory of the Law of Employment
Discrimination,22 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 188 (2001) (suggesting that McDon-

nell Douglas depends for its operation on the assumption that discrimination is preva-
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essentially a variation on the process of elimination argument 2 40 : the
idea behind this criticism is that McDonnell Douglas works because
once certain reasons for the challenged action (such as those in the
prima facie case and those proffered by the defendant) are eliminated, it seems likely that discrimination is the reason-at least as
long as one believes that discrimination is prevalent. 241 However,
McDonnell Douglas simply does not depend on such an assumption.
We have seen how McDonnell Douglas works. It works by giving
plaintiffs an opportunity to attack the defendant's proffered reason,
thereby setting in motion a chain of inferences which may culminate
in an inference of discrimination. There is no place in this chain
where an assumption of discrimination is necessary. In the last link,
discrimination can be inferred from a cover-up. 24 2 This inference can
be drawn as long as the factfinder is open to the possibility that a
cover-up might be a cover-up for discrimination. The factfinder can
be open to this possibility irrespective of any belief about the prevalence of discrimination.
This is not to say that a factfinder's belief that discrimination is
widespread would not be helpful to a plaintiff. It is only to say that
such a belief is irrelevant to summary judgment; that is, such a belief is
not necessary to be able to use McDonnell Douglas. A belief that discrimination is widespread goes to the probability that a cover-up was a
cover-up for discrimination. A factfinder with such a belief would be
more likely to conclude that a cover-up was a cover-up for discrimination. But this is irrelevant on summary judgment. At the summary
judgment stage, the issue is not the probability that the factfinder will

lent); McCormick, supra note 15, at 176 (same); Sullivan, supra note 21, at 930
(same). Perhaps the most colorful version of the assumption-of-discrimination argument is made by Professor Calloway, who equates a failure to assume discrimination
in such cases with Holocaust denial. See Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks: Questioningthe Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REv. 997, 1036 (1994).

240 See supra Part I.C.2.
241 This argument is related to, but distinct from, the argument that McDonnell
Douglas works by a process of elimination. The elimination argument concludes that,
once the defendant's proffered reason has been eliminated, discrimination is the only
possible explanation. As discussed above, in Part I.C.2, this argument is erroneous.
The prevalence-of-discrimination argument is that, once the proffered reason and the
common reasons of the prima facie case have been eliminated, discrimination is-or
should be considered- the most likely explanation. An excellent discussion of this reasoning, as well as its empirical flaws, can be found in Malamud, supra note 6, at
2254-62.
242 See supra Part I.C.1.
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draw the inference. The only issue is whether a reasonable factfinder
243
could draw such an inference.
If McDonnell Douglas worked by process of elimination, the analysis might be different. Under the elimination method, the inference
of discrimination must rest upon the mere fact that some nondiscriminatory reasons (a few common reasons and the defendant's proffered
reason) have been eliminated. 24 4 This inference seems weak. Arguably, it is so weak that absent a belief that discrimination is widespread,
a reasonable factfinder would not draw the inference. 245 But this is
not a problem in McDonnell Douglas. The inference of discrimination
in McDonnell Douglas does not rest upon the mere elimination of some
reasons. Rather, it rests upon lies and cover-ups-and the longstanding principle of law that where a party lies to the factfinder, the
24 6
factfinder can infer that the party was trying to avoid legal liability.
243 See FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c). A need-for-assumption-of-discrimination critic might
argue that, absent an assumption of widespread discrimination, the facts would be in
equipoise, requiring summary judgment for the defendant. The argument is that,
absent such an assumption, a factfinder would have no way to choose which inference
to draw in the pretext chain: no way to determine (1) whether an incorrect proffered
reason was a good faith error or a lie, (2) whether a lie was a benign lie or a cover-tIp,
or (3) whether a cover-up was for a non discriminatory reason or a discriminatory
reason. Absent such guidance, the argument goes, summary judgment would be
appropriate. However, this argument confuses the standard for a plaintiff's verdict (a
preponderance of evidence/more likely than not) with the standard for summary
judgment. Where two competing fact scenarios are in equipoise, a factfinder should
find for the defendant (under the preponderance standard). However, whether two
competing fact scenarios are in equipoise is a fact question, which cannot be resolved
on summaryjudgment. The whole point is that it is the factfinder's role to determine
the likelihood that each of two competing scenarios occurred. While assumptions as
to the widespread nature of discrimination might aid the factfinder in making such a
determination, such assumptions play no role on summary judgment. See JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 475 & n.15 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that where
competing inferences are equally plausible, summary judgment should be denied: as
the trial judge need only determine that the non-movant's [here, plaintiffs] evidence on an issue is 'facially plausible and capable of being accepted by a rational
factfinder' in order to deny a summary-judgment motion" (quoting James Joseph
Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary Judgment, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1523,
1560 (1995))). Put differently, equipoise goes to whether the plaintiff met its burden
of persuasion-a factual question. On summary judgment, the question is essentially
whether the plaintiff met its burden of production-of producing evidence that
would allow a reasonable factfinder to find the fact in question. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text (noting that factfinders can infer guilt from the fact that the
defendant ran from the scene of an accident-even if an equally likely explanation
might exist).
244 See supra Part I.C.2.
245 The validity of such an argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
246 See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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This inference is far stronger than an inference from elimination.
The McDonnell Douglas inference does not require an assumption that
247
discrimination is widespread.
D.

Claims of McDonnell Douglas' Inadequacy

In recent literature, many critics argue that McDonnell Douglas is
theoretically incapable of addressing the complex decisionmaking
that characterizes much of modem discrimination. Critics claim that
McDonnell Douglas is inadequate for dealing with modern discrimination in two respects.
1.

Dealing with Multiple Factors

Several critics believe the McDonnell Douglas is a binary, "eitherand therefore incapable of dealing with employment decimodel,
or"
sions based on multiple factors. 248 Itis probably true that most mod247 It is true that the prima facie case relies on the elimination method. See Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981) ("The prima facie case
serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejection."). However, the analysis in the text
highlights what a weak inference this is (at least without an assumption of widespread
discrimination). To the extent that we rely on the prima facie case solely as a way to
trigger the defendant's obligation to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason, the weakness of this inference does not seem problematic. See supra note 91. But it is more
problematic when we speak of the "continuing relevance" of the prima facie case at
the pretext stage. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143
(2000) ("[A]lthough the presumption of discrimination 'drops out of the picture'
once the defendant meets its burden of production . . .the trier of fact may still
consider the evidence establishing the plaintiff's prima facie case and 'inferences
properly drawn therefrom ...on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is
pretextual.'" (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n. 10)).
248 See Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 2003)
(criticizing-and rejecting- McDonnell Douglas as a false dichotomy); Hart, supranote
8, at 758 (arguing that "courts applying the McDonnell-Douglasframework mistakenly
assume that employment decisions are motivated by a single factor-either honest
business judgment or dishonest discriminatory motivation" and explaining that
"employment decisions are not either-or events, but events with multiple motivations"); Krieger, supra note 15, at 1179 ("Within the pretext paradigm, it is simply not
possible for an employment decision to be both motivated by the employer's articulated reasons and tainted by intergroup bias; the trier of fact must decide between the
two."); Stonefield, supra note 64, at 113 (stating the assumption that "a dichotomous
result [lies] at the end of the McDonnell Douglas fact-finding road"); see also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("Where a decision was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives.., it simply
makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was the 'true reason' . . . for the
decision-which is the question asked by [McDonnell Douglas]." (internal quotation
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ern employment decisions (or even most human decisions) are based
on multiple factors. 249 The concern is that a framework which can
only contemplate one cause for an action-either a legitimate cause
or discriminatory cause-cannot address this type of decisionmaking.250

But McDonnell Douglas is perfectly capable of addressing multifactor decisionmaking. That is, a factfinder using McDonnell Douglas
could find that the employer was motivated by both legitimate and
illegitimate factors. McDonnell Douglas permits employers to proffer
multiple reasons for their actions-which they often do. 2 51

And

McDonnell Douglas permits a plaintiff to prevail by successfully challenging just one of those reasons. 252 This means that a factfinder can
find a discriminatory motive (based on the conclusion that one proffered reason was pretextual) along with a nondiscriminatory motive
(based on the perceived legitimacy of one of the other proffered reasons). Thus, the framework has no problem dealing with multi253
motive decisionmaking.
marks and citation omitted)), supersededby statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999)
(discussing "truth versus lies" claim); Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 597 (3d Cir.
1995) (en banc) (same); id. at 600 (Greenburg, J., concurring) (same); Waltman v.
Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 481 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); Green, supra note 8, at
91-92 (arguing that McDonnellDouglas presents an either-or paradigm); Kaminshine,
supra note 14, at 18 & n.87 (same); Stonefield, supra note 64, at 113 (same).
249 See llO CONG. REC. 13,837, 13,837 (1964) (statement of Sen. Case) ("If anyone
ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of
animal from any I know of."); RUTHERGLEN, supra note 3, at 47 ("[F] ew cases are likely
to involve employers who rejected the plaintiff for discriminatory reasons alone.");
Krieger, supra note 15, at 1215 ("It will be the rare employer indeed who can accurately identify the reasons why he hired or promoted one employee over another, fired
another, or set salary increases as he did ....
[I]n the real world one simply cannot
control the multiplicity of causal antecedents so as to determine the causal efficacy of
race, gender, national origin, or age.").
250

Hart, supra note 8, at 758.

251 E.g., Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir. 2005); Clay v.
Holy Cross Hosp., 253 F.3d 1000, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2001); Wallace v. Methodist Hosp.
Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Rosenthal, supra note 15, at 335
("[E]mployers ... often articulate numerous justifications .....
252

See supra Parts I.C.2-3, III.B.

253 Again, I make no claim as to the likelihood that a factfinder will find only some
of a defendant's multiple proffered reasons to be pretextual. See supra note 89. It is
certainly possible that factfinders might tend to assess the credibility of the employer
on a global level, finding either all or none of the employer's proffered reasons to be
truthful. The point is that there is nothing about the framework that mandates such a
binary view.
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The "either-or" critics base their claim on the fact that McDonnell
Douglas appears to require a binary choice. 25 4 A factfinder must
choose between finding a proffered reason to be legitimate and finding that reason to be a pretext. In its simplest terms, the factfinder
must find any particular proffered reason to be either true or false.
However, this does not render the framework itself binary. It
only means that, with respect to each proffered reason, the factfinder
must make a binary choice (either that reason is true or false).255
Where there is more than one proffered reason, the factfinder is not
faced with such a binary choice. The factfinder is free to conclude
that the employer had discriminatory motives (based on one proffered reason being pretextual), while also concluding that the
employer had one or more legitimate motives.
That being said, this binary aspect of McDonnell Douglas-the fact
that it requires a factfinder to conclude that any particular proffered
reason is either true or false-does result in two significant limitations
on the utility of the framework. First, it means that McDonnell Douglas
cannot be used to ferret out true but post hoc justifications for challenged employment actions. For example, suppose that defendant
fired plaintiff because of her sex, but claimed that the firing was based
on excessive tardiness. And suppose that the plaintiff was, in fact,
excessively tardy as measured by the employer's attendance policy. In
such a case, McDonnell Douglas would not work to prove discrimination. This is because McDonnell Douglas only works where the defendant's proffered reason is false (and thus susceptible to inferences of
lying, cover-up, and discrimination) .256 It will not work where the
defendant's proffered reason is true-even where that reason did not
in fact motivate the defendant. 25 7 In such a case, the plaintiff will
need to find some way to prove discrimination other than McDonnell

Douglas.258
Second, this binary aspect means that McDonnell Douglas cannot
be used in cases involving proffered reasons that are true, but infected
254

See supra note 248 and accompanying text.

255 In fact, even this choice is not binary. As noted in Part I.C.1, a factfinder can
conclude that a proffered reason is not correct without concluding it was a cover-up
for discrimination.
256 See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
257 Cf supra Part I.C.2-3 (noting that McDonnell Douglas cannot prove "but for"
causation because it cannot eliminate all nondiscriminatory reasons for the defendant's actions).
258 For example, the plaintiff might be able to prove that the tardiness policy had
never been applied before despite tardiness by other employees, or that it was not
applied uniformly among employees of different races, sexes, or ages. Such comparative evidence is not pretext evidence. See supra note 76.
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with bias. For example, suppose again that the employer stated that it
fired the plaintiff for excessive tardiness. And suppose again that the
plaintiff was in fact excessively tardy, as measured by the employer's
attendance policy. But suppose also that the employer only enforced
the attendance policy against women. Or suppose that the employer
was predisposed to notice the plaintiffs tardiness as a result of stereotypes of women (or women with families) as being less dedicated to
their jobs than male employees. 259 Again, McDonnell Douglas could
not be used to expose the defendant's discriminatory-but-true reason.
It only works where the proffered reason is false. Again, the plaintiff
would need to find some other way to prove discrimination other than
McDonnell Douglas.

Yet, to the extent that these two limitations are at the nub of the
either-or criticism, the criticism loses its force-at least in a world with
a nonmandatory McDonnell Douglas. Any criticism based on these two
limitations is simply a criticism that McDonnell Douglaswill not work to
prove discrimination in every case in which there is discrimination.
But no method of proof works in every case. As long as McDonnell
Douglas is not mandatory-that is, as long as it is understood as simply
being one way in which the plaintiff can prove discrimination-it is
260
hard to get too upset over the fact that sometimes it will not work.
2.

Dealing with Unconscious or Subtle Bias

A final criticism of McDonnell Douglas,which has been quite influential in recent commentary, is that the framework only works to
detect conscious discrimination (i.e., that the framework is incapable
of ferreting out unconscious or subtle discrimination). 261 Because
much of modern discrimination seems to be unconscious, the concern is that McDonnellDouglas is incapable of detecting and addressing
259 See Krieger, supra note 15, at 1179. Professor Krieger focuses on unconscious
bias-that is, stereotypes outside of the decisionmaker's awareness. But the problem-this limitation on the utility of McDonnell Douglas-is the same whether the bias
that infects the proffered reason is conscious or unconscious.
260 Moreover, as I will argue below, it works in many cases where other methods
will not. See infra Part III.E.
261 See Krieger, supranote 15, at 1241 (arguing that McDonnell Douglasis incapable
of addressing subtle or unconscious discrimination); see also Hart, supra note 8, at
756-57, 765 (noting that many courts applying McDonnell Douglas require plaintiffs to
show pretext by showing the employer lied, an approach that only leads to liability for
conscious, not unconscious, discrimination); Wax, supra note 15, at 1147-49 (stating
that "[t]he McDonnell Douglas formulation is clearly geared to a narrow view of discriminatory intent: its operation depends on a defendant's possessing a conscious or
deliberate state of mind" and arguing that McDonnell Douglas does not adequately
address unconscious bias).
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this important form of discrimination. 262 However, it is far from clear
that McDonnell Douglas is incapable of addressing unconscious
discrimination.

263

This criticism seems to stem from the fact that many courts and
commentators have (correctly) stated that McDonnell Douglas requires
dishonesty-a lie. 264 These critics are apparently concerned that the

notion of lying connotes conscious deception. Thus, they reason,
2 65
McDonnell Douglas is incapable of detecting unconscious bias.

It is easy to see why one might think of McDonnellDouglasin terms
of conscious lies. A great many courts and commentators have spoken
of McDonnell Douglas as a way of proving "intent"-another term that
connotes conscious activity. 2 6 6 Moreover, the pretext doctrine in
McDonnell Douglas has its roots in evidentiary and criminal law doctrines that are based on conscious awareness of guilt.26 7 And some

courts have even suggested that McDonnell Douglas requires a "deliber268
ate falsehood."
Yet, it is not so clear that the type of lie required by McDonnell
Douglasmust be conscious. Recall that McDonnellDouglas works based
on the concept of lies and cover-ups. From the fact of a lie, a
factfinder can infer a cover-up, and from the fact of a cover-up, a
factfinder can infer discrimination. 269 This chain of inferences would
seem to work to detect unconscious lies and cover-ups as well as conscious ones.
For example, suppose that an employer believes that he is equality-minded and would never discriminate. But unconsciously, he
harbors negative stereotypes of African Americans. When money is
262 See, e.g., Hart, supra note 8, at 757-58.
263 It is open to debate whether it makes sense to hold people accountable for
mental processes that are outside of their consciousness, both from a moral perspective (whether it makes sense to assign blame) and a practical perspective (whether
there is any prospect of deterrence). However, such questions are beyond the scope
of this Article. This Article will simply address the criticism that McDonnell Douglas is
incapable of detecting unconscious bias-taking as a starting point the assumption of
these critics that doing so would be a good thing.
264 See, e.g., Hart, supranote 8, at 754-55 & n.75 (cataloging examples). Professor
Hart argues that the law does not in fact require proof of dishonesty. See id. at
755-66. However, she does not argue the same for McDonnell Douglas. Rather, she
(correctly) asserts that McDonnell Douglas does require dishonesty, but argues that, in
light of the 1991 Act and Desert Palace, courts should not require plaintiffs to use
McDonnell Douglas. See id. at 758.
265 See, e.g., id. at 757-58.
266 See Martin Katz, No Intent, No Foul?, LEGAL TIMES, May 21, 2007, at 35.
267 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
268 See, e.g., Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006).
269 See supra Part I.C.1.
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missing from the cash drawer, the employer concludes that the plaintiff, an African American, stole the money. So the employer fires the
plaintiff. When asked why, the employer says he fired the plaintiff for
theft.
Now suppose that the plaintiff manages to challenge this proffered explanation. For example, suppose that the plaintiff shows that
he was not in a position to have stolen the money, or that someone
else stole the money. 270 From the defendant's error, a factfinder
could conclude one of two things: either the employer thought in
good faith that the plaintiff stole the money, or the employer was
lying. But there are actually two types of lie that might be relevant.
The employer might be consciously lying to the court in order to conceal a racist motive. Or the employer might be unconsciously lying to
himself-in order to cover up his own racist stereotypes. It would
seem that either type of lie and cover-up would support an inference
of discrimination. Thus, it seems quite possible that McDonnell Douglas would work to ferret out unconscious, as well as conscious,
discrimination.
But even if McDonnell Douglas were not capable of dealing with
unconscious discrimination, this would not be a reason to scrap the
framework. As long as this framework is understood as being nonmandatory-as being just one way that plaintiffs can show discrimination-then the fact that it will not always work to prove discrimination
does not seem particularly problematic. While it might not work in
some cases, it does work in other cases. And as long as it works in
some cases, it would seem to be a useful part of the arsenal of methods
for proving discrimination.
E. A World Without McDonnell Douglas
This point, which has concluded the last two subsections,
deserves particular attention. If McDonnell Douglas were mandatory
and less than perfect, it might make sense to get rid of the framework-at least if something better were available. 27 1 But, as we saw
above, McDonnell Douglas should never be treated as mandatory. 2 72
Thus, the standard is not perfection, or even whether McDonnell Doug270 The most common form of evidence offered in such cases is comparative evidence (e.g., that other nonminority employees stole money but were not fired). Such
comparative evidence is not properly thought of as evidence of pretext in the McDonnell Douglas sense. See supra note 76.
271 At least some critics of McDonnell Douglasdo not advocate scrapping it. Rather,
they propose supplementing it. See, e.g., Green, supra note 8, at 144-56.
272 See supra Part I.C.3-5.
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las is the best method of proof. As long as McDonnell Douglas serves
some useful function-as long as it works in some cases-it should be
retained.
But McDonnell Douglas should be appreciated more than thismore than simply as a method of proof which works some of the time.
To understand why, we need to look at the alternative methods of
proof available.
There are only a limited number of ways to prove discriminatory
causation-and they are all far from perfect. Causation may be
proven by a defendant's admissions (e.g., "I fired her because she is a
woman"). Needless to say, such admissions are rare. Alternatively,
causation may be proven by statements by decision makers that do not
amount to admissions, but which nonetheless indicate a tendency
toward bias (e.g., "I do not like women" or "women do not belong at
work"). As employers become more litigation-seasoned, it has
273
become increasingly rare for plaintiffs to discover such statements.
Moreover, even where a plaintiff can offer proof of such a statement,
there is often a dispute as to its relevance under the so-called "stray
remarks" doctrine. 27 4

Another method of proving causation is

through the use of statistics. But this type of proof requires a large
number of decisions by the decisionmaker in order to be usefulwhich is unlikely in most workplaces. Moreover, collecting and
2 75
presenting statistical evidence generally requires costly experts.
Finally, plaintiffs can try to prove causation by the use of comparative-but nonstatistical-evidence (e.g., the fact that the last two
nonminority employees who were accused of theft were not fired,
while the plaintiff was fired for theft). The problem with this type of
273 See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 15, at 1213.
274 See, e.g., Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 813 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that "stray" remarks that are insufficiently related to a decision will not
defeat a motion for summary judgment); Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d
1204, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936,
941-42 (4th Cir. 1992) (same). While it is beyond the scope of this Article, the weight
that should be given to such remarks would seem to be a factual question for ajurynot a question of relevance and therefore admissibility. Any such remark would seem
to make it more likely that a decision by the speaker was biased.
275 There has been a fair amount of discourse about using experts for another
purpose: to testify about the prevalence or likelihood of subtle forms of discrimination in workplace culture. See Lee, supra note 80, at 487 & n.46 (summarizing commentators who have called for increased use of experts on structural discrimination).
However, it seems unclear how an expert might prove discrimination in a particular
decision absent some evidence specific to the decision, or at least specific to the decisionmaker. Such evidence would likely take one of the forms discussed in the text.
And in any event, putting on expert testimony of this sort is expensive.
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evidence is that comparators' situations are rarely identical to the
plaintiffs situation, giving rise to debates about the value of the com276
parators and often precluding the use of such evidence.
McDonnell Douglas pretext evidence, in contrast, is readily available-at least in cases where the defendant proffers a false reason for
the challenged action. It does not depend on the fortuity of an admission, an overheard statement, or differently treated coworkers as comparators. It does not depend on there being a large number of
decisions by the decisionmaker, as statistical evidence does. And it is
relatively inexpensive to put on, as it requires little discovery and no
experts. As a practical matter, in many cases, pretext evidence will be
the only evidence of causation available to plaintiffs. If McDonnell
Douglas were not available-if it were eradicated, as several of its critics
seem to wish-many plaintiffs who are victims of discrimination would
likely lose their ability to obtain a remedy. In this sense, McDonnell
277
Douglas really is a gift to plaintiffs.
The gift of McDonnell Douglas is not only in that it forces at-will
employers to provide a reason for their actions, thereby providing
plaintiffs with a "target" to try to discredit, and thereby prove discrimination. Nor is the gift limited to the ability to take advantage of the
principle that permits adverse inferences against lying parties. The
gift is also in its simplicity and cost-effectiveness. And, perhaps most
importantly, it provides one more way of accomplishing the difficult
2 78
task of proving causation.
276 See, e.g., Sublett v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 463 F.3d 731, 740-41 (7th Cir.
2006) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where comparators were not
sufficiently similar to the plaintiff).
277 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1985) (stating that McDonnell Douglas is "designed to assure that the 'plaintiff [has] his day in
court despite the unavailability of direct evidence'" (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979))).
278 Notably, despite the large number of critics of McDonnell Douglas, none has
proposed a true alternative to this method of proof. Most critics have proposed adoption of one of the two alternative frameworks (Price Waterhouse or the 1991 Act). See,
e.g., Hart, supra note 8, at 791. As this Article has shown, these frameworks are not
mutually exclusive with McDonnell Douglas;,they do not provide alternative methods of
proof. See supra Part II.A. While some critics have proposed a more radical solution-a more aggressive burden-shifting mechanism that would require any employer
who takes an adverse action against a female or minority worker to prove a lack of
discrimination-that proposal is also not a method of proof. See RUtrHERGLEN, supra
note 3, at 42. So even this more radical solution is not an alternative to McDonnell
Douglas. (Moreover, this radical solution has additional problems. While it might
lead to more judgments against employers, it is contrary to the general philosophy of
our legal system: innocent until proven guilty. Moreover, such burden-shifting
schemes are generally justified based on the likelihood that the presumed fact (dis-
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CONCLUSION

Although originally intended by the Court as a gift to antidiscrimination law, McDonnell Douglas has come under increasing fire
and is currently the subject of severe disrepute. But this is due largely
to misunderstanding. The framework has been misunderstood in
terms of when to apply it-mistakenly being thrust upon unwilling
plaintiffs. And it has been misunderstood in terms of what it does.
Properly understood, McDonnell Douglas represents an effective and
efficient way that plaintiffs may, at their option, try to prove discriminatory causation. In this sense, it is a gift to antidiscrimination law,
and an important tool in the quest to eradicate discrimination in the
workplace.

crimination) is the actual state of affairs. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 105 (3d ed. 2003) (noting that burdens of proof are often
allocated according to the likelihood that a party will have access to particular facts).
As noted above in Part III.C, the likelihood that any particular adverse employment
action was the product of discrimination is a subject of considerable debate.)

